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ABSTRACT 
 
The Welfare State and Anti-Poverty Policy in Rich Countries 
 
This paper is prepared as a chapter for the Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 2 
(edited by A. B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, Elsevier-North Holland, forthcoming). Like the 
other chapters in the volume (and its predecessor), the aim is to provide a comprehensive 
review of a particular area of research. The aim of this chapter is to highlight some key 
aspects of recent economic research on the welfare state and anti-poverty policy in rich 
countries, and explore their implications. We begin with the conceptualisation and 
measurement of poverty, before sketching out some core features and approaches to the 
welfare state and anti-poverty policies. We then focus on the central plank of the modern 
welfare state’s efforts to address poverty, namely social protection, discussing in turn the 
inactive working-age population, child income support, in-work poverty, and retirement and 
old-age pensions. After that we discuss social spending on other than cash transfers: the 
labour market, education, training and activation, and finally intergenerational transmission, 
childhood and neighbourhoods. We also discuss the welfare state and anti-poverty policy in 
the context of the economic crisis which began in 2007-8, and the implications for strategies 
aimed at combining economic growth and employment with making serious inroads into 
poverty. We conclude with highlighting directions for future research. 
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The Welfare State and Anti-Poverty Policy in Rich Countries1 
 
Section 1: Setting the Scene 
1.1 Introduction 
 Seen by some as primarily a manifestation of inequality in the distribution of income 
and wealth and by others as a distinctive phenomenon, poverty continues to represent a core 
challenge for rich countries and their welfare states. This is reflected in the very substantial 
body of research on poverty in industrialised countries, both country-specific and 
comparative, which seeks to capture the extent of poverty and how it is changing over time, 
understand its nature, and assess the effectiveness of policies and strategies aimed at 
addressing it. Poverty is widely regarded as a key social concern in most rich countries, not 
only in terms of the quality of life of those affected but also their wasted potential, as well as 
the risks to the social fabric and social cohesion more generally. (Chapter 24 by Martin 
Ravallion argues that the notion that poverty not only should but can be eliminated in such 
countries is a relatively recent development, and also discusses in depth the links between 
poverty and macroeconomic performance). While the nature of poverty and how best to 
tackle it remain hotly contested at a political and ideological level, the focus of research has 
increasingly been on the effectiveness or otherwise of anti-poverty policies and strategies, 
which the recent economic crisis has served only to reinforce.  
 The aim of this chapter is to highlight some key aspects of recent economic research 
on the welfare state and anti-poverty policy in rich countries, and explore their implications. 
A core theme will be that the way poverty is conceptualised and measured has fundamental 
implications for how anti-poverty policy is thought about, designed and implemented. We 
therefore begin Section 1 with conceptualisation and measurement and key patterns and 
trends (on which see also Jäntti and Danziger, 2000), before sketching out some core features 
and approaches to the welfare state and anti-poverty policies. Section 2 then focuses on the 
central plank of the modern welfare state’s efforts to address poverty, namely social 
protection, discussing in turn the inactive working-age population, child income support, in-
work poverty, and retirement and old-age pensions. Section 3 looks beyond social protection 
                                                 
1 We thank participants at the April 2013 Conference “Recent Advances in the Economics of Income 
Distribution” held at the Paris School of Economics and organized by A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon. 
Particularly thanks go to Rolf Aaberge who served as the main discussant of this paper. 
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to discuss social spending on other than cash transfers, the labour market, education, training 
and activation, and finally intergenerational transmission, childhood and neighbourhoods. 
Section 4 discusses the welfare state and anti-poverty policy in the context of the economic 
crisis which began in 2007-8, and the implications for strategies aimed at combining 
economic growth and employment with making serious inroads into poverty. Finally, Section 
5 highlights directions for future research. 
 
1.2 Conceptualising and Measuring Poverty 
 The definition of poverty underpinning most recent research in Europe relates to 
exclusion from the ordinary life of the society due to lack of resources, as spelt out for 
example in the particularly influential formulation by Townsend (1979). This has also been 
very influential from a policy-making perspective, as evidenced by the definition adopted by 
the European Economic Communities in the mid-1980s: 
“The poor shall be taken to mean persons, families and groups of persons whose 
resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the 
minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live”.  
Poverty from this starting-point has two core elements: it is about inability to participate, and 
this inability to participate is attributable to inadequate resources. Most economic research 
then employs income to distinguish the poor, with a great deal of research and debate on how 
best to establish an income cut-off for that purpose. There are also substantial theoretical and 
empirical literatures on concepts such as social exclusion (see for example Kronauer, 1998) 
and on the ‘capabilities’ approach pioneered by Sen (see for example 1980, 1993), which 
have implications for how one thinks about and measures poverty. Indeed, a concern with 
‘poverty’ per se may be seen as predominantly an Anglo-Saxon concern, with concepts such 
as deprivation and social exclusion more often the focus in countries such as France or 
Germany and with the ‘level of living’ approach to living standards and wellbeing of central 
importance in the Nordic countries (and having much in common with Sen’s capabilities 
approach in general orientation, on which see for example Erikson, 1993).    
In comparative analysis, the most common approach to deriving income thresholds 
has been to calculate them as proportions of median income in the country in question, with 
50% or 60% of the median the most widely used. The underlying rationale is that those 
falling more than a certain ‘distance’ below the average or normal income in their society are 
unlikely to be able to participate fully in it, and notable examples from a very large literature 
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adopting this approach are Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) and the OECD’s recent 
studies Growing Unequal? (2008) and Divided We Stand (2011). Such research, like that on 
income inequality, was for many years bedevilled by differences in definition and measures 
in the data available for different countries, but sources such as the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) micro-database, the figures produced by Eurostat from micro-data for the EU 
countries, and the database of aggregate poverty (and inequality) estimates assembled by the 
OECD have greatly improved this situation. Differences across countries and trends over 
time in relative income poverty measured in this fashion have played a central role in 
European research and policy debate, and Chapter 9 in the present volume by Morelli, 
Smeeding and Thompson presents evidence on trends in such measures to which we will 
return below.2   
This approach to deriving income thresholds can be contrasted with the USA, where 
the existence of a long-standing official poverty line has fundamentally influenced how 
poverty is debated and research carried out. That standard goes back to the 1960s, when it 
was originally based on the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet, multiplied by a factor to take 
account of non-food spending, but its key feature is that it has subsequently been up-rated in 
line with consumer prices, rather than linked to average income or living standards. To 
characterise this contrast as between “relative” versus “absolute” notions of poverty would be to 
over-simplify, since above subsistence level notions of what constitutes poverty inevitably 
reflect prevailing norms and expectations. The key issue in making comparisons over time is 
whether the poverty standard is fixed in terms of purchasing power – ‘anchored’ at a point in 
time - or increases as average living standards rise. As Lampman (1971) put it in a US context, 
in fighting a “War on Poverty” one may want to monitor how well one is doing in meeting a 
fixed target rather than redefining the target as income changes. However, over any prolonged 
period where average living standards are rising, this may lose touch with the everyday 
understanding of poverty in the society. Thus an influential expert panel reviewing the US 
official measure saw poverty in terms of insufficient resources for basic living needs, 
“defined appropriately for the United States today” (Citro and Michael, 1995). 
The fact that the “anchored” measure has continued to be seen as relevant in the USA 
– for all its well-recognized and analysed technical limitations – is in itself thus a reflection of 
the fact that growth in median real incomes has been modest there. In Europe, the set of 
                                                 
2 Many different ways of establishing such a threshold have been proposed, for example by reference to what it 
costs to buy a specified basket of goods and services, to ordinary expenditure patterns, to standards implicit in 
social security support rates, or to views in the population about for example the income needed to “get by”.  
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poverty and social inclusion indicators adopted by the EU since 2001 have supplemented 
purely relative income poverty thresholds with ones anchored at a point in time some years 
earlier and up-rated in line with prices. The onset of economic crisis from 2007-8, when 
median income and thus relative income thresholds actually fell in some countries, proved a 
salutary reminder of the value of such anchored thresholds. Similar arguments apply in 
making comparisons across countries at rather different levels of average income: neither purely 
country-specific relative measures nor common thresholds tell the whole story with respect to 
poverty. In a European context this was brought to the fore by the accession to the EU in 2004 
and 2007 of new eastern countries with much lower levels of average income than the ‘old’ 
member states.  
Alternative ways of establishing an income poverty threshold in a rich country have been 
proposed, for example by reference to what it costs to buy a specified basket of goods and 
services, to ordinary expenditure patterns, to standards implicit in social security support rates, 
or to views in the population about for example the income needed to “get by”. This continues to 
represent a significant theme in poverty research literature, as shown by recent attempts to apply 
the ‘basket of goods’ approach in a consistent fashion across a variety of European countries (for 
a discussion of strengths and limitations of these alternatives see Nolan and Whelan, 1996). 
However, the extent to which this research has impacted on policy formulation and debate 
remains quite limited, with the relative and anchored income lines dominating, one suspects not 
least because of their reasonably straightforward empirical derivation. 
In a similar vein, the way household size and composition are taken into account in 
applying those income lines is for the most part rather straightforward. The household is 
conventionally taken as the income recipient unit, as in the study of income inequality more 
broadly, assuming that income is shared so members reach a common standard of living. The 
fact that the types of household identified as poor (much more than the overall poverty rate) 
can be highly sensitive to the precise equivalence scale employed has been known for some 
time (see for example Buhmann et al., 1987, Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins, 1992), but in the 
absence of a more satisfactory alternative emerging from research practice is to rely on 
several commonly-used scales (the square root of household size, the ‘OECD’ scale, and the 
‘modified OECD scale) and (at best) present result with more than one so that this sensitivity 
can be assessed. While a number of studies have sought to open up the household ‘black box’ 
from a poverty perspective – a sub-set of the research on intra-household inequality more 
broadly discussed in Chapter 17 of the present volume by Chiappori and Meghir – this has 
had little impact on practice in empirical analysis and policy formulation.     
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The same could be said of the extensive literature on how best to capture the extent of 
poverty in a single summary indicator, where despite the considerable literature developing 
sophisticated indicators the most commonly-used measure remains the simple headcount. 
Amartya Sen highlighted as long ago as the mid-1970s how this faces the policy-maker with 
the perverse incentive to target the least poor, and his (1976) and alternative ways of 
incorporating the “poverty gap” and inequality among the poor have been debated, often 
derived from a set of axioms representing a priori notions of the properties such a measure 
should have. The Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty measures, for 
example, are additively decomposable and, additionally, allow for different judgements 
regarding the importance attached to the extent on inequality among the poor. Such poverty 
measures that capture poverty intensity also suffer from greater sensitivity to measurement 
error, though, especially the presence of extreme low incomes which often reflects mis-
reporting,3 and as Myles (2000) argues their mathematical representation may have made 
their meaning obscure to potential users. The robustness of poverty orderings has also been a 
long-standing concern in the literature (Atkinson, 1987; Zheng, 2000), and dominance 
approaches developed for income inequality comparisons have been the adapted for use in 
the poverty context (for a recent example see Duclos and Makdissi (2005), but once again 
this has not entered mainstream empirical practice, where the comparison of poverty 
headcounts over time or across countries on the basis of one or at most a very limited set of 
thresholds and equivalence scales remains the norm. An awareness of the importance of 
measurement error and the need to take statistical confidence intervals seriously in such 
comparisons does appear to be increasing, however (see for example Goedeme, 2013). There 
have also been significant improvements in the quality and comparability of income data for 
poverty analysis in recent years (as is the case for the analysis of income inequality more 
generally, as brought out in Morelli, Smeeding and Thompson’s chapter 9 and in Toth, 2014), 
not least due to the efforts of organisations such as the OECD, the Luxembourg Income 
Study, and Eurostat as well as national statistics offices.  
A substantial strand in recent research on poverty which is increasingly influencing 
practice has focused instead on questioning what economic research had tended to take for 
granted: that current income is the most satisfactory, or least bad, yardstick available for 
identifying the poor. It has instead been argued forcefully that low income fails in practice to 
                                                 
3 The poverty gap measure advanced by Hills (2002), based on the distance between the threshold and the 
median income of the poor, is one response to that problem. 
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distinguish those experiencing poverty and exclusion, because current income does not 
capture the impact of savings, debt, previous spending on consumer durables, owner-
occupied housing, goods and services provided by the State, work-related expenses such as 
transport and child-care, and geographical variation in prices, because needs also differ in 
ways missed by conventional equivalence scales (for example in relation to disability), and 
because income from self-employment, home production and capital are particularly difficult 
to measure accurately. One response is to measure financial poverty in terms of consumption 
rather than income, on the basis that the transitory component is a great deal smaller, but 
expenditure as measured in household budget surveys often covers only a short period and is not 
the same as consumption, while low expenditure may be associated with saving and does not 
necessarily capture constrained resources. Other avenues explored in research have been to 
impute income from durables, owner-occupied housing and non-cash benefits, to broaden the 
needs incorporated into equivalence scales, and to combine survey and other data to improve the 
measurement of income.  
The exploitation of longitudinal data has also been a significant contributor to 
income-based poverty research. Poverty measures are often based on the income of the 
household in a specific week, month or year, but (even if measured accurately) income at a 
particular point in time may not be representative of the usual or longer-term income of the 
household. Longitudinal data tracking households and their incomes have now become much 
more widely available, allowing those who move in and out of low income to be 
distinguished from those who are persistently on low income, and a dynamic perspective on 
income now plays a central role in research on poverty. Bane and Ellwood (1986) pioneered 
research on the length of spells in poverty in the USA, and cross-country analysis was 
pioneered by Duncan et al. (1993). Comparative studies of income poverty dynamics since 
then include OECD (2001), Whelan et al. (2003), Fouarge and Layte (2005) and Valletta 
(2006). Movements in and out of poverty are special cases of more general income mobility, 
discussed in Chapter 11 by Jäntti and Jenkins in this volume. Available studies show what the 
OECD (2001) has summarised as the seeming paradox that poverty is simultaneously fluid 
and characterised by long-term traps. Many spells in poverty are short and represent only 
transitory set-backs, and considerably fewer people are continually poor for an extended 
period of time than are observed in poverty at a point in time, but on the other hand the 
typical year spent in poverty is lived by someone who experiences multiple years of poverty; 
comparison across countries has found poverty persistence to be particularly high in the USA 
and much lower in countries with lower cross-sectional poverty rates. The EU’s social 
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inclusion indicators now include a measure of persistent poverty, the percentage below the 
relative poverty threshold in the current year and at least two of the previous three. More 
generally, this aspect of poverty research, with its emphasis on trying to understand not only 
once-off poverty entries and escapes but also the cumulative experience of poverty over 
years, has had a major impact on the way policy effectiveness is thought about and assessed.  
As well as broadening the measurement of income/financial resources and their 
dynamics, a parallel development in recent poverty research has sought to go beyond income, 
with a view to: 
• identifying the poor more accurately and understanding the causal processes at 
work,  
• capturing the multidimensional nature of poverty, and/or  
• encompassing social exclusion conceived as something broader than “financial 
poverty”. 
Non-monetary indicators of deprivation have been used for quite some time to directly 
capture different aspects of living standards and social exclusion (either on their own or 
combined with low income), to validate an income poverty threshold, and/or to bring out 
graphically what it means to be poor; the review of the literature on measures of material 
deprivation in OECD countries by Boarini and Mira d’Ercole, (2006) listed over a hundred 
studies. Over the past decade or more, non-monetary indicators measured at micro-level are 
also increasingly being used in order to capture the multidimensional nature of poverty and of 
social exclusion more broadly – especially in Europe, where the concepts of social exclusion 
and social inclusion have come to be widely used alongside poverty in research and policy 
circles, unlike the USA where they have so far had little purchase. Comparative analysis of 
datasets such as the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) organised by 
Eurostat and carried out in most of the (then) EU member states from the mid-1990s to 2001, 
and the EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data-gathering framework 
which replaced it, has identified distinct dimensions of disadvantage (see for example 
Whelan et al. 2001; Eurostat, 2005; Guio and Macquet, 2007; Guio, 2009; Nolan and 
Whelan, 2010, 2011), bringing out that low income alone is not enough to predict who 
experiences poor housing, neighbourhood deprivation, poor health and access to health 
services, and low education. The measurement of multi-dimensional poverty and inequality, 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this volume by Aaberge and Brandolini, raises complex issues not 
only about the best way to identify and empirically capture particular dimensions, but also 
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how information about different aspects of deprivation or exclusion is best summarised across 
those dimensions (on which see Tsui, 2002; Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2002; Atkinson, 
2003; Aaberge and Peluso, 2012).  
The focus on multidimensionality has gone well beyond a purely academic concern to 
also influence the way poverty reduction targets have been framed, both nationally and at EU 
level. The national poverty reduction target adopted in Ireland in the 1990s, for example, was 
framed in terms of the combination of low income and ‘basic’ deprivation, and lively debates 
about how best to frame targets for child poverty in the UK have centred on the role of 
multidimensionality. Since 2001 the EU’s Social Inclusion process has at its core a set of 
indicators designed to monitor progress and support mutual learning that is explicitly and 
designedly multidimensional, including but going beyond income-based poverty indicators, 
including indicators of material deprivation and housing deprivation (see Atkinson et al., 
2002; Marlier et al., 2007; Nolan and Whelan, 2011) Chapter 3). Even more strikingly, when 
in 2010 the EU adopted the Europe 2020 strategy for jobs and growth, which for the first 
time included poverty reduction among its high-level targets, the target population for 
poverty reduction was identified as those:  
• below the 60% of national median threshold relative income threshold, and/or; 
• above the material deprivation threshold, and/or; 
• in a jobless household. 
A total of 23% of EU citizens were identified as ‘at risk of poverty and social exclusion’, as 
this was labelled, significantly more than the 16% below the ‘headline’ 60% of median 
relative income threshold, and EU leaders pledged to bring at least 20 million of these people 
out of poverty and exclusion by 2020. While once can readily criticise the logic and 
implications of this precise combination of elements (on which see Nolan and Whelan, 2011, 
2012), it represents a powerful illustration of the role which multidimensional measures, and 
direct measures of material deprivation as a central component, have come to play in framing 
European anti-poverty policy.  
 The European poverty target evolved from a process of development and adoption of 
social inclusion indicators at EU level over the previous decade (see for example Atkinson et al, 
2002), which has had a significant influence on data and analyses of poverty and anti-poverty 
policy in Europe, and indeed on the way poverty is thought about and research framed. This 
serves as an important example of the broader point that a good deal of research on poverty is 
carried out or sponsored by bodies – national or international – that have an interest in 
demonstrating that particular sets of policies or orientations towards anti-poverty strategy are or 
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are likely to be successful. In a more subtle way, their perspectives will influence the data and 
indicators available to researchers and thus the analyses that can be readily undertaken. There 
have been enormous advances in the availability of accessible microdata in recent years, which 
has fundamentally influenced poverty research and helped to ‘democratise’ it, but the influence 
of national governments and international organisations remains substantial.   
 Finally, in discussing how poverty research is approached differences in disciplinary 
perspectives are also important. For example, researchers from an economics perspective are 
generally more comfortable with financial indicators of living standards and exclusion, and 
highlight the role of economic incentives in understanding and tackling poverty, whereas 
sociologists have often been more open to employing non-monetary measures, and highlight the 
role of social stratification and social context. Having said that, there has been significant 
blurring of disciplinary boundaries and poverty research has become a site for particularly 
fruitful collaborations between inter alia economists, sociologists, social policy analysts, 
geographers, anthropologists, educationalists, epidemiologists, psychologists, and indeed 
geneticists and neuroscientists, of which this review chapter can only give a flavour, 
concentrating for the most part on the economics literature.  
 
1.3 Key Patterns and Trends  
 As the previous section has highlighted, the most common practice in comparative 
research on poverty remains the application of relative income poverty thresholds and 
comparisons of headcounts of the proportions falling below those thresholds in different 
countries. On that basis poverty rates for various OECD countries based on the data in the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) have been compared in for example Atkinson, Rainwater 
and Smeeding (1995), Fritzell and Ritakallio (2004), the OECD has assembled estimates for 
many of its member countries at intervals from 1980 which have underpinned its important 
studies in this area (notably OECD 2008, 2011), and annual estimates are also now produced 
by Eurostat for all the member states of the EU. This, together with national data, provides a 
substantially improved evidence base for the study of poverty across countries and over time. 
 Chapter 9 in this volume by Morelli, Smeeding and Thompson summarises broad 
trends in relative income poverty over time, with figures from the LIS suggesting that from 
the mid-1980s to mid-2000s relative income rates generally rose or stayed stable, with very 
few examples of significant falls. The OECD’s analysis of the estimates of relative income 
poverty it assembled, as examined in Burniaux et al. (1998), Forster and Pearson (2002), 
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Förster and d’Ercole (2005), Growing Unequal? (2008) and Divided We Stand (2011), 
highlighted that the most common direction of change in those figures was upwards. The 
corresponding data produced by Eurostat covers only (most of) the countries in the EU-15 for 
the period from the mid-1990s to 2001, based on the ECHP, while the expansion of the Union 
to 27 member states was accompanied by the development of a new statistical apparatus 
underpinning these estimates, EU-SILC, from about 2004; this means that trends before 2004 
can be assessed only for the ‘old’ member states and, for many of these, with a break in the 
series in the early 2000s which affects comparability. None the less, the feature displayed by 
these figures highlighted by a number of studies is the disappointing progress in bringing 
relative income poverty rates down despite strong growth in employment in some countries 
over the decade to the mid-2000s (see for example Cantillon, 2011).  
It is important to note however that there is considerable variability in country 
experiences and that the stability in the overall poverty rate can mask major underlying shifts 
for different groups. The OECD’s studies, for example, show that the trend in relative income 
poverty for working age people in the second half of the 1990s and into the 2000s was 
generally upwards, often reflecting a decline in the poverty-reducing impact of taxes and 
transfers, but pensioners saw sizeable declines in many countries. So policies operating with 
respect to one important target group – such as older persons – could be having substantial 
success in reducing poverty while that is obscured by the impact of changes for other groups. 
In a similar vein, child poverty – the focus of particular attention from policy-makers in 
recent years – may not necessarily move in the same direction as the overall poverty rate, 
with the UK providing an example where trends in child versus overall poverty have deviated 
substantially over the past two decades.   
The OECD has also usefully documented trends in overall poverty taking a threshold 
“anchored” at 50% of the median in the mid-1980s and then indexed to price changes. On 
this measure, all OECD countries achieved significant reductions in ‘absolute’ poverty up to 
2000. In countries like Ireland and Spain, which experienced very rapid income growth, 
poverty in 1995 measured this way was one-sixth the level of 10 years earlier. The US 
poverty rate on this basis shows a decline from the mid-1980s up until 2000, though smaller 
than the average decline of the 15 OECD countries included in the study (Förster and 
d’Ercole, 2005). In a similar vein, it is striking that some countries where relative income 
poverty remained quite stable or even rose have seen very marked falls in levels of material 
deprivation, notably some of the lower-income countries joining the EU from 2004 as the 
common indicators of material deprivation now also produced by Eurostat serve to 
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demonstrate. The evolution of alternative measures of poverty since the onset of the 
economic crisis across the OECD from 2007-08 is also of central relevance, as we discuss in 
detail in the final Section of this chapter.  
 National studies for various countries also shed light on poverty trends and the factors 
at work, though given differences in methods and approaches it is more difficult to generalise 
from them. In the USA, for example, most analyses of long-term poverty trends focus on the 
official poverty rate, which is not linked to average or median income (see for example Page 
and Stevens, 2006; Meyer and Wallace, 2009; Smeeding and Thompson, 2013). This (and 
variants of it) was higher in the 1980s than the 1970s but despite subsequent falls was still as 
high in the mid-2000s as it had been in the mid-1970s. Stagnant median wage growth, rising 
inequality and the evolution of unemployment have been highlighted in studies, with the 
changing wage distribution assigned a central role in explaining poverty trends. Studies of 
poverty trends in the UK, by contrast, have generally focused on relative income poverty and 
have highlighted the role of changes in the transfer and direct tax systems in the increase 
recorded in the 1980s and into the 19990s and then stabilisation from the late 1990s. 
However, as Dickens and Ellwood (2003) emphasise in a comparative study of Britain and 
the United States, the factors influencing poverty trends can differ substantially between 
absolute and relative measures as well as countries and it is hazardous to generalise.  
Trends in poverty over time, overall and for specific sub-groups, offer one important 
window into the causal factors involved and into ‘what works’ in addressing poverty, 
especially in terms of the impact of changes made in social protection and tax systems. It is 
also striking, though, that the ranking of countries in terms of relative income poverty rates 
tends to be fairly stable over time. Table 1 shows the percentage of persons in households 
falling below 50% and 60% of median (equivalised) disposable household income in 25 
OECD countries around the mid-2000s. The simple fact that there is very considerable cross-
country variation in poverty measured this way – with some countries displaying percentages 
below 60% of the median as low as 11-12% and at the other extreme countries having figures 
twice that high – and that the ranking of countries tends to be reasonable stable over time 
suggests that there are important structural factors at work from which anti-poverty strategies 
have much to learn. 
 
[Table 1. Income Poverty Rates in OECD Countries, Mid-2000s] 
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A similar point is brought home by reference to the variation across countries in 
relative income poverty rates for specific population sub-groups. Table 2 illustrates this with 
the rates for children and older persons falling below 50% of national median income, 
compared with the population as a whole. Children have above-average rates in about half the 
countries shown, with the gap being particularly wide in the UK and the USA, but in a 
substantial minority their rate is below average. The elderly have an above-average rate in 
most countries, with substantial variation in the size of the gap, and there are some where 
their rate is well below the average. A similar comparison across the EU 27 using data from 
EU-SILC shows similar patterns. So this reinforces the notion that there is much to be learned 
in policy terms from analysis of the situation and treatment of similar groups in different 
countries.  
 
[Table 2. Income Poverty Rates for Children and Elderly in OECD Countries, Mid-2000s] 
 
The same is true of other groups which are generally thought of as vulnerable. For 
example, the unemployed face a significantly heightened risk of relative income poverty 
virtually everywhere, but the gap between them and the employed varies widely across 
countries. Similarly, lone parents often face much higher risks of poverty than couples with 
one or two children, but that gap varies a great deal. As OECD (2005) points out, in many 
countries it is not living a single-parent households per se that increases risk, but rather the 
likelihood that parent is not in work. As we shall see, this type of comparative analysis plays 
a central role in research aimed at informing anti-poverty policies and strategies.  
It is also worth noting that although relative income poverty measures are sometimes 
dismissed as really only capturing inequality, in fact a country (or group within it) can have 
zero poverty despite substantial inequality. To give concrete examples, in both the 
Netherlands and New Zealand the incidence of relative poverty among the elderly (with the 
50 per cent of median threshold) is close to zero, although there is very substantial income 
inequality among their elderly populations. The redistributive effort required to truncate the 
distribution at a widely used poverty threshold like 50 per cent of median equivalent income 
is in fact a fraction of the actual redistributive flows that take place in most countries. In 
practice, as Figure 1 shows, broadly speaking where inequality in disposable income is high 
then relative income poverty rates tend to be high as well, but similar inequality levels can be 
associated with quite different levels of relative income poverty.  
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[Figure 1. Gini Coefficient for Disposable Income and Relative Income Poverty (60% median)] 
 
1.4 The Welfare State and Poverty 
As Barr (2001) puts it, the welfare state combines the role of piggy bank and Robin 
Hood, providing collective insurance against social risks while also aiming to ameliorate 
need and poverty. Redistribution can be horizontal, across the life cycle, or vertical between 
higher and lower incomes. Poverty reduction is by no means the sole criterion against which 
the success of Welfare State institutions would or should be judged – whether at a point in 
time or over the life-cycle – but it would be widely accepted as among the core aims. 
Research aimed at assessing success or failure in those terms can focus at the aggregate level, 
at specific population sub-groups, or at particular institutional structures, interventions or 
innovations, and can be for a particular country or from a comparative perspective.  
The nature of that research is also multi-faceted. At one end of the spectrum one can 
locate studies of the effectiveness of very particular aspects of institutional structures or 
changes in those structures on the target population to whom they are directed. Such 
evaluation studies employ a wide variety of analytical and technical approaches, which have 
been the subject of intensive development in the economics literature in recent years. While 
the outcome studied is occasionally whether people are lifted out of poverty, there is a much 
more extensive literature focusing on effectiveness in getting unemployed persons into 
employment, improving performance in school, keeping people out of jail or improving their 
health, all of which may be expected to impact on poverty status. While randomized 
controlled trials are recently in vogue in this context - though the negative income tax 
experiments conducted in the USA and Canada in the 1970s provide early large-scale 
examples4 - more commonly assessments are not based on such an approach. The methods 
employed include reduced form or limited information models (including least squares, 
matching methods including propensity score matching, instrumental variable analysis or the 
closely related regression discontinuity design approach, and difference in difference 
estimation) versus the estimation of structural models/parameters.5 Such methods are 
discussed extensively in other Handbooks in this series (notably those focused on labour 
economics, since assessing the impact of labour market programmes has been a particularly 
                                                 
4 See for example Levine et al. (2005). 
5 For discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative approaches see Chetty (2009), Deaton 
(2010), Heckman and Urzua (2010), Imbens (2010) and Heckman (2010). 
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fertile field of application); purely from the point of view of research on poverty, though, 
while influencing specific national reform efforts they have had much less impact on the way 
anti-poverty policy is thought about more broadly. 
In that respect, comparative analysis of poverty outcomes and redistributive effort 
across countries over time continues to dominate. This is underpinned by the fact that the 
direct effect of transfers and direct taxes on measured poverty is seen to differ very 
substantially across countries. OECD analysis concludes that the best-performing countries 
succeed in lifting about two-thirds of their pre-tax/transfer poor above the threshold, while 
others only manage to move one-quarter above. Recent EU statistics tell a similar story, as 
Table 3 illustrates: welfare systems reduce the risk of poverty by 38% on average across the 
EU, but this impact varies from under 15% to over 60% across the member states. Some 
countries achieve better ‘efficiency’ (i.e. reduce poverty more for each euro or dollar spent) 
through targeting low-income groups, and the role of means-testing is one of the most hotly-
debated aspects of anti-poverty policy, to which we return below. However, the prior point to 
be made here is that the pattern of incomes from the market, taken as the baseline for 
comparison, will itself be very much influenced by social transfers, and indeed by welfare 
state institutions more broadly. The existence of social transfers allows substantial numbers 
of households to have no income from the market, which would not be sustainable otherwise, 
and the welfare state also affects incentives to work and save in many other ways: the ‘no 
welfare state’ counter-factual is not known. 
 
[Table 3. Income Poverty Rates Pre- and Post-Transfers in EU Countries, 2007] 
 
A favoured mode of analysis in comparative studies is to take a set of countries – at a 
point in time or pooling cross-sections over time – and assess the relationship between 
poverty outcomes and a wide set of independent variables reflecting population structures, 
welfare spending levels and aspects of labour market and welfare state institutions. (These 
parallel, and sometimes overlap, similar studies employing income inequality as dependent 
variable reviewed in depth in Chapter 20 of the current volume by Forster and Tóth). 
Particularly influential studies in this vein include Korpi and Palme (1998), Moller et al 
(2003), Kenworthy (2011). In such comparative analysis countries may be taken as individual 
units of observation, or they may be grouped together into different “welfare regimes”, 
designed to capture key commonalities/differences in welfare state institutions. Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) distinction of three distinct regimes has been highly influential: the 
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liberal/Anglo-Saxon countries with minimal public intervention and a preference for targeting 
and reliance on the market, the social democratic/Nordic countries with comprehensive social 
entitlements, and the Continental welfare states with conservative origins built around social 
insurance but often along narrowly defined occupational distinctions and a significant degree 
of reliance on the family (see also Esping-Andersen, 1999, 2009). A fourth ‘Southern’ regime 
is also generally distinguished (Ferrera, 1996), and the treatment of the formerly communist 
countries of eastern Europe is also a matter for debate - the relationship between aggregate 
social spending and poverty levels looks systematically different for the countries which 
joined the EU in 2004 versus the “old” 15 members (see for example Tsakloglou and 
Papadopoulos, 2002), but treating them as a single ‘regime’ may not be satisfactory. Many 
empirical studies have brought out the extent to which conventional indicators of (relative 
income) poverty vary systematically across welfare regimes (for a recent example see 
Whelan and Maitre, 2010), and highlight the consistently low rates found in Nordic countries 
compared with the generally high (though varying) ones seen in the liberal and southern 
European countries. Looking in some detail at the make-up of household income by source, 
Maitre, Nolan and Whelan (2010) show that countries in the anglo-saxon/liberal regime were 
distinctive in the extent to which low-income households were dependent on social transfers, 
and also in the extent to which that dependence served as a predictor of material deprivation. 
The social democratic and corporatist regimes were characterised by a more modest degree of 
welfare dependence among low-income households, while in the Southern Mediterranean 
countries welfare was not strongly associated with low income and was a particularly poor 
predictor of deprivation.  
Aggregate-level comparative analysis of this type suggests that while transfer and tax 
systems are undoubtedly key in underpinning variations in poverty levels, other institutional 
features also contribute in the best performers, notably high levels of minimum wage 
protection and strong collective bargaining compressing wages, more extensive public and 
subsidized employment as well active labour market programmes, higher levels of public 
spending on education etc (see also Chapter 20 in this Handbook). Disentangling the effect of 
these various factors is inherently fraught with difficulties, and that is where simulation via 
tax-benefit models, discussed in detail in Chapter 26 of this volume by Figari, Paulus and 
Sutherland may be particularly helpful. The Euromod research programme in particular has 
enabled comparative tax-benefit simulation analysis across the EU (Immervoll et al., 2006, 
Figari and Sutherland, 2013) with major implications for policy. To take just one example, 
Cantillon et al. (2003) showed that simply increasing spending on transfers would have a 
 17 
limited impact on poverty in some EU countries because much of it would go to those already 
above the poverty line, particularly in the Southern European welfare states where pensions 
dominate. 
Another central strand of comparative poverty research has focused on analysis of the 
characteristics associated with being in poverty and the underlying processes involved, 
employing micro-data. This has been the subject of a very wide variety of studies covering 
many countries, both descriptive and econometric. Broadly speaking, the types of individual 
or household seen as at particular risk of poverty include those with low levels of education 
and skills, the low paid, the unemployed, people with disabilities, lone parents, large families, 
the elderly, children, ethnic minorities, migrants, and refugees. However, there is substantial 
variation across countries in the patterning of risk, with major implications for how the 
underlying processes are understood and for policy. The extent to which individual 
characteristics, qualifications or experiences manifest themselves in high poverty rates is 
clearly seen to depend on the household, labour market and institutional settings in which 
those “disadvantages” are experienced. To take one example, the poverty risk for the 
unemployed compared with others is seen to depend on whether they have dependants, 
whether there are others in the household at work, and how the welfare state and its 
institutions try to cushion the impact of unemployment, most importantly through social 
protection. Strikingly, a high employment rate is clearly not a sufficient condition for low 
poverty among the working aged population, which as we discuss below is of central 
relevance when boosting labour market participation is at the heart of anti-poverty policy in 
many countries.  
Finally, the availability of longitudinal data has also allowed the development of 
econometric modelling of poverty dynamics, which seeks to link observed movements into or 
out of poverty over time to changes in the earnings, labour force participation and 
composition of the household; Duncan et al. (1993) was the first to do so in a comparative 
setting. A distinction is often made in such dynamic analyses between income “events”, such 
as changes in earnings or benefits, and demographic “events” such as the arrival of a new 
child, partnership formation, death, marital dissolution, or offspring leaving home. The 
comparative dynamic analysis by OECD (2005) suggests that changes in household structure 
may be less important in poverty entries and escapes in European countries than in the USA, 
with changes in transfers as well as earnings seen to be important in the EU and to a lesser 
extent in Canada, but much less so in the USA.  
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Section 2: Social Protection and Redistribution 
2.1 Introduction 
Cash spending as a percentage of GDP is the most widely used measure of how much 
“effort” is being made to directly redistribute income. Despite its widespread use, this 
measure has some well documented shortcomings. First, it ignores the need to jointly analyze 
benefit and tax policies. Conventional measures of (gross) social expenditure tend to 
overestimate the cost of welfare in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, where a substantial 
amount of benefit spending is clawed back through taxation. Conversely, in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia, a substantial share of social spending takes the form of tax breaks for 
social purposes rather than cash transfers (Adema et al., 2011). Another widely 
acknowledged weakness of this measure is that is a very imperfect indicator of policy intent 
and policy design. A high level of spending may result from very generous benefits flowing 
to small numbers of people, and not necessarily people occupying the bottom end of the 
distribution, for example government elites. Yet it may also result from relatively small 
benefits flowing to a large number of people (De Deken and Kittel, 2007). 
And yet several studies have established a strong empirical relationship at country 
level between the overall level of social spending and various measures of inequality and 
inequality reduction, including (relative) poverty. This is arguably one of the more robust 
findings of comparative poverty research over the past decades (Atkinson, Rainwater and 
Smeeding, 1995; Ferrarini and Nelson, 2003; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; 2000; Nolan 
and Marx, 2009; Pestieau, 2006; Kenworthy, 2004; 2008; 2011; Kraus, 2004; OECD, 2008; 
Immervoll and Richardson, 2012). Notable in these analyses was that no advanced economy 
achieved a low level of inequality and/or relative income poverty with a low level of social 
spending, regardless of how well that country performed on other dimensions that matter for 
poverty, notably employment. Vice versa, countries with relatively high social spending 
tended to have lower inequality and poverty. Here the extent of cross-country variation was 
always more significant, with some countries achieving more limited inequality/poverty 
reductions despite high social spending. 
There number of countries for which internationally comparative data are available has 
increased over recent years recently. As Figure 2 shows, there are now a number of countries 
(the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, as well as Korea) that do combine fairly low 
levels of social expenditure with low relative poverty rates and income inequality. For the 
Central European countries, part of the explanation may lie in a reliance on tax breaks as 
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social policy tools, which are not captured in gross social spending indicators. More 
generally, the redistributive impact of taxes is not captured here (Verbist, 2004; Verbist and 
Figari, 2014). 
 
[Figure 2. Cash public social expenditure and income inequality on working age, late 2000s] 
 
This relatively strong relationship between social spending and poverty at the country 
level probably does not simply reflect the direct impact of transfers only: high-spending 
countries have other institutional features that contribute, notably high levels of minimum 
wage protection and strong collective bargaining compressing wages (hence limiting overall 
inequality), more extensive public and subsidized employment as well active labour market 
programmes, higher levels of public spending on education etc. Disentangling the effect of 
these various factors is inherently fraught with difficulties. There may in fact be mechanisms 
of mutual reinforcement between these factors (Beramendi, 2001). Barth and Moene (2009) 
argue that a more equal wage distribution leads to welfare generosity through a process of 
political competition. In turn, more income redistribution produces more equality. The 
authors hypothesize that this ‘equality multiplier’ operates mainly through the bottom of the 
income distribution: the amplification occurs where wages near the bottom of the distribution 
are compressed, not where higher incomes are compressed. They find empirical support in 
their analyses on 18 OECD countries over the years 1976 to 2002.6 
While in theory low or moderate levels of social spending could produce low poverty 
rates if resources were well-targeted, the reality remains that almost no advanced economy 
achieves a low (relative) poverty rate, or a high level of redistribution, with a low level of 
social spending. Large, universal welfare systems, while on paper being least distributive, 
                                                 
6 There is a sizeable political economy literature on this issue. McCarty and Pontusson (2009) review a number 
of political economy theories with regard to voter behaviour under different conditions of economic inequality. 
The so-called median voter models assume that changes in the income distribution lead to a shift in the 
preference of the median voter, or the ‘political middle’. Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003) argue that under 
conditions of rising income inequality, the median voter has a preference for reduced expenditure on insurance 
and social spending. Earlier Meltzer and Richard (1981) formulated an opposing hypothesis, predicting that 
rising income inequality leads to a shift in preferences of the median voter towards more redistribution. The 
evidence is quite mixed. Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) find empirical support for the Meltzer and Richard 
thesis. Milanovic (2000) finds a consistent association between gross household income inequality and more 
tax/transfer redistribution in a set of 24 democracies in the period of the mid seventies-mid nineties. More 
recently Olivera (2012), performing an analysis on a pool of 33 European countries, finds that inequality 
increases the demand for redistribution and that increases in income inequality stimulate the demand for 
redistribution. Yet the empirical evidence varies and some studies arrive at opposite conclusions (Iversen and 
Soskice 2006, 2009; Finseraas 2009; McCarty and Pontusson 2009; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Toth, Horn and 
Medgyesi 2013).  
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distribute in fact the most. Systems that by design strongly target resources to towards the 
poorest tend to be in fact less redistributive. Korpi and Palme (1998) have called this the 
‘paradox of redistribution’. 
There is a long-standing controversy in welfare state literature over the question of 
whether targeting benefits towards the bottom part of the income distribution actually 
enhances the redistributive impact of welfare state policies, especially of social transfer 
policies. This issue is of far more than academic importance. In its 2011 Divided We Stand?, 
the OECD states that “redistribution strategies based on government transfers and taxes alone 
would be neither effective nor financially sustainable”. In this context the OECD (2011) calls 
for “well-targeted income support policies”. Organisations like the IMF and the World Bank 
have long advocated targeted benefits. The issue of targeting will probably gain even more 
poignancy in a post-crisis period marked by continued and in some cases increased budget 
austerity.  
The debate on targeting is still marked by opposed views. On the one side there are 
those who belief that a welfare state can only fight poverty effectively and efficiently (i.e. 
cost-effectively) when benefits are mainly targeted to those most in need, i.e. when benefits 
are selective. The straightforward argument here is that selective benefit systems are cheaper 
because fewer resources are ‘wasted’ on people who are not poor. Lower public expenditures 
imply lower taxes, which in turn are said to be conducive to economic growth. Economic 
growth, the argument proceeds, benefits the poor directly (although not necessarily 
proportionally so) and increases at the same time the fiscal base for redistributive policies. 
This view of selectivity has never been commonly shared. Two sorts of arguments 
underpin this more critical stance. First, there are technical considerations. Van Oorschot 
(2002) sums up the most important dysfunctions of means-testing. First, these include higher 
administrative costs. Establishing need or other relevant criteria require monitoring, whereas 
universal benefits allow for less complex eligibility procedures. Furthermore, means tested 
benefits are subject to higher non-take up, partly because of stigmatization issues. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, targeted benefits can give rise to poverty traps, where benefit 
recipients have little incentive to take up work because this would entail loss of benefits.  
A second line of counter-argument is that proponents of selectivity pursue a 
‘mechanical’ economic argument that makes abstraction of the political processes which 
determine how much is actually available for redistribution. The reasoning is that, 
paradoxically, in countries with selective welfare systems fewer resources tend to be 
available for redistribution because there is less widespread and less robust political support 
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for redistribution. As a consequence, the redistributive impact of such systems tends to be 
smaller. To put it differently: some degree of redistributive “inefficiency” (the Matthew-
effect) is said to foster wider and more robust political support for redistribution, including to 
the most needy. This follows from the fact that a universal welfare state creates a structural 
coalition of interests between the least well-off and the politically more powerful middle 
classes (median voter theorem). By contrast, a selective system entails an inherent conflict 
between the least well-off, by definition the sole recipients of social transfers, and the better 
off, who fund the system without the prospect of getting much out of it.  
The juxtaposition outlined above forms the starting point for Korpi and Palme’s 
highly influential ‘Paradox of Redistribution’, a paper in which they claim that more selective 
systems, paradoxically, have a smaller redistributive impact than universal systems offering 
both minimum income protection as well as income security and cost compensations (for 
children) in a broader sense. Korpi and Palme (1998) find that, in effect, this relationship is 
mediated by the relative size of available means for redistribution. Countries with selective 
redistribution systems, they argue, spend less on redistribution, at least in the public sector. In 
essence, selective systems are generally smaller systems. 
The degree of redistribution is measured here by comparing the actually observed 
income inequality or at-risk-of-poverty rate with a rather unsophisticated ‘counterfactual’ 
distribution (Bergh, 2005). In theory this counterfactual ought to accurately reflect the 
income distribution that would prevail in the absence of social transfers. However, the 
construction of this counterfactual is hampered by theoretical and practical problems. In most 
cases, including in Korpi and Palme’s paper, pre-transfer income is simply calculated by 
deducting observed social transfers and re-adding observed taxes. Full abstraction is thus 
made of any behavioural effects which a change in tranfer/tax regime would entail. While 
patently less than perfect, the reality is that no satisfactory method exists to adequately model 
such behavioural effects. Many studies have pursued similar empirical approaches, for 
example Nelson (2004; 2007). 
Another critique has been formulated by Moene and Wallerstein (2003) who have 
argued that analyses of redistribution need to be done at a more disaggregated level than ‘the 
welfare system’ because the determining redistributive principles may differ substantially for, 
say, unemployment, health care or pensions. Some schemes may rest heavily on the insurance 
principle, while others may put more weight to the need-principle. Universality and 
selectivity can coexist within one system. Yet Moene and Wallerstein (2001) also conclude 
that universal provisions provoke the largest political support because of the higher chance of 
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middle class citizens to become a beneficiary. Some opinion based studies also confirm that 
universal welfare schemes enjoy broader support (Kangas, 1995).  
Some recent studies, however, claim that the link between redistribution and universal 
provision has substantially weakened, or even reversed over time. Kenworthy (2011) 
reproduces and updates Korpi and Palme’s analyses, which related to the situation in 11 
countries as of 1985. Kenworthy’s findings confirm that countries with more universal 
benefits achieve more redistribution (measured in the size of redistributive policies in the 
budget) for the period 1980 to 1990. By 1995, the image becomes less clear. Data for 2000 
and 2005 seem to indicate that there is no longer any association (either positive or negative) 
between the two variables. Evidently, the findings are based on a small number of cases, 
which make them particularly sensitive to outliers. A trend towards more targeting in 
Denmark, in conjunction with an evolution towards more universal benefits in the US, is 
largely responsible for the shift in conclusions. Moreover, the new findings may be driven to 
some extent by the growing share of pensions in social spending. Kenworthy (2011:58) 
writes about this: “This by no means settles the question, but it does suggest additional reason 
to rethink the notion that targeting is an impediment to effective redistribution.”  
Figure 3, taken from Marx et al. (2013), strengthens the finding that the relationship 
between the extent of targeting and redistributive may have weakened considerably. Here 
targeting is captured through the concentration index. This is calculated in a similar way as 
the Gini coefficient. The more negative the concentration coefficient, the more targeted the 
transfers, whereas the closer the concentration coefficient is to the Gini, the more universal 
the transfers are distributed. Australia, the United Kingdom and Denmark have most negative 
concentration coefficients and can be characterized as strongly pro-poor. Negative 
concentration coefficients are found in the majority of the countries, pointing to a substantial 
degree of targeting. Note however that the term ‘targeting’ suggests that outcomes are due to 
the characteristics of the system, but this need not be the case. Moreover, the outcomes of a 
system are highly dependent on the characteristics of the underlying population, in terms of 
socio-demographic characteristics, income inequality, composition of income, etc. If, for 
instance, a benefit is designed in such a way that all children are eligible, but all children are 
situated in the bottom quintile, then this policy measure may appear as targeted in its 
outcomes, even though its design may not include any means-testing or needs-based 
characteristic. This means that strictly speaking we cannot derive from the concentration 
coefficient how pro-poorness of a transfer comes about.  
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[Figure 3. Concentration index (ranking by gross income) and redistributive impact, mid 
2000s] 
 
Redistribution refers to the impact of taxes and transfers on income inequality. It is 
measured by the difference between the Gini coefficients with and without tax-transfers 
relative to pre-transfer income; this corresponds in this analysis to the difference of the Gini 
coefficients of market and disposable income relative to that of market income. The impact 
on inequality is driven by the size of transfers, as well as by their structure, i.e. whether these 
transfers are going relatively more to lower or higher incomes. 
Looking more closely at this graph, at the left hand side are Australia, the United 
Kingdom and Denmark, all characterized by having benefit systems that are the most strongly 
pro-poor of all countries. Yet the redistributive impact in Denmark appears to be much 
stronger. Similarly, looking at the countries with still strong pro-poor spending (concentration 
indices between -0.2 and 0), the corresponding redistributive impact differs a great deal. 
Some of the countries with the strongest redistributive tax/transfer systems are to be found 
here (Sweden and Finland), together with some countries with the weakest (the USA, 
Canada, Israel and Switzerland). On the right hand side of the graph – the countries with 
positive targeting coefficients – the relationship does become consistently negative, 
especially in the countries with the weakest pro-poor spending (Greece, Spain and Italy).  
Why does a similar degree of strong targeting, as captured by the concentration index, 
produce stronger redistributive outcomes in Denmark as compared to the UK and Australia? 
Similarly, why do similar (quasi)-universal systems yield such different redistributive 
outcomes across countries? This strongly suggests that design features matter. It is notable 
that one relationship remains fairly strong: the one between the extent of targeting and the 
size of the system. But there are exceptions here: a country like Denmark does combine a 
strong degree of targeting with a high level of social spending.  
The strongest redistributive impact is achieved by countries that combine moderate 
(Sweden and Finland) to strong targeting (Denmark) with comparatively high levels of 
spending. This suggests that the most redistributive systems are characterized by what is 
called ‘targeting within universalism”. That is to say: systems in which many people receive 
benefits but where the poorest get relatively more.  
Yet it is interesting to note that the very strong relationship between the extent of 
targeting and the size of the spending has weakened, as is documented by Kenworthy (2011). 
One of the factors that arguably made targeted systems less politically robust and prone to 
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spending cuts in the 1980s was the fact that strongly targeted (means-tested) benefits entailed 
strong work disincentives and also (perceived) family formation incentives. The last decades 
have seen an intensified attention to this issue. To reduce work disincentives, earnings 
disregards have been introduced for people who make a (partial) transition from complete 
benefit dependency to part-time work.  
Most importantly, perhaps, means-tested benefits are no longer exclusively aimed at 
people not in work, but also at those in work in low-paid jobs. The French RSA (Revenu de 
Solidarité Active) scheme is a good example of a new style means-tested benefit scheme that 
offers integrated support for the non-employed and (part-time) low paid workers alike. The 
scheme also has entirely different work incentives. The RSA was introduced in France in 
2008 the specific aim of remodelling the incentive structure social assistance beneficiaries, 
and particularly to make work or returning to education a more lucrative financial prospect. 
The previous minimum income system (Minimum Integration Income - RMI) was based on a 
one for one trade-off of benefit for earned income. Under RSA a 62% slope is applied. 
Efforts have also been made to encourage beneficiaries of RSA into employment, for 
example with assisted employment contracts and (improved) insertion mechanisms. In 
addition, the RSA has simplified the provision of social protection by combining several 
previously separate schemes into a single sum. A household with no earned income is eligible 
for the “basic RSA” which is defined at the household level and takes into account the 
composition of the household. The “in-work RSA” acts as a top-up for people paid less than 
the national minimum wage (SMIC).  
The point here is that targeted, means-tested systems look totally different today from 
the systems in place in the 1980s. Whereas the old systems were the focus of harsh welfare 
critiques, especially from the right, the new targeted systems are lauded as gateways of 
welfare to work. They enjoy broad partisan support, as is evident in the UK where the WTC, 
implemented by the Labour government, building on a scheme implemented under a 
Conservative one, is again expanded by the current Conservative one. Similarly, in France, 
the newly elected socialist government has no intentions for a major overhaul of the RSA, 
introduced by the Fillon/Sarkozy government. 
In the United States, the Earned Income Tax Credit – a transfer program for 
households on low earnings – has become the country’s pre-eminent welfare programme 
(Kenworthy, 2011). The system appears to enjoys far broader and more robust political 
support than earlier American anti-poverty programmes. The system also is less strongly 
targeted than earlier provisions and it caters to larger sections of the electorate, including the 
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(lower) middle class, and this may account for that expansion. But an equally if not more 
important factor may well be the fact that the system is perceived to encourage and reward 
work.  
 
2.2 Cash Transfers for the Inactive Working-age Population 
Much comparative poverty research that has sought to link observed variation in 
income inequality and poverty across countries to policy has relied on government (social) 
spending statistics as indicators of policy ‘effort’. As we have seen, the relationship across 
countries between the level of social spending as a percentage of GDP, or some related 
indicator, and observed inequality or poverty levels is in fact by and large a rather strong one. 
This is in a way surprising because the level of spending is as much reflective of the number 
of people receiving benefits than it is of the level and thus potential adequacy of those 
benefits. Likewise, measured outcomes, for example pre versus post transfer differences in 
inequality or poverty also depend on a host of factors that are independent or only indirectly 
influenced by policy: contextual and compositional factors, including labour market 
conditions (unemployment, employment patterns, wages), household composition (patterns 
of cohabitation, marriage, divorce, childbirth, …), policies which influence these dynamics 
(e.g. ALMPs, child care,..)  
If we want to understand variations in outcomes we need more sophisticated and 
accurate measures of policy effort and policy design than spending indicators. So-called 
institutional indicators aim to be directly reflective of policy intent and design. Replacement 
rates for various branches of social insurance are commonly applied indicators of social 
protection. They are intended to express the level of benefit generosity within a particular 
provision, for example unemployment or disability insurance. The OECD has been compiling 
such time series for a considerable length of time. Academic databases have been compiled 
by, among others, the Swedish Institute of Social Research (the SCIP database) and the 
University of Connecticut (Scruggs database).  
While such indicators are more directly reflective than spending based measures of 
what actually happens at policy levels they are not without their drawbacks. One is that 
replacement rates are generally expressed as a proportion of a reference wage. This is 
problematic for various reasons. With the growth of part-time and temporary employment, it 
has, become increasingly difficult to specify a consistent wage denominator on the basis of 
available data. More importantly, wages have generally not evolved in line with the standard 
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of living (and thus the relative poverty threshold). In many countries the standard of living 
has increased thanks to the proliferation of dual income families rather than through real 
wage growth. The mere fact that benefits follow wages says little about the potential 
adequacy of benefits in terms of poverty relief. A second important problem is that 
replacement rates, e.g. within the systems of unemployment insurance or invalidity, do not 
capture the entitlement criteria applied, nor do they adequately express the entitlement 
periods. Nonetheless, there are strong indications that these are precisely the areas where 
policymakers have intervened the most. Unemployment benefit entitlement, for example, is 
now linked more strongly with job-search intensity. A third important issue is that 
replacement rates are based on a narrow rationale and tend to be calculated on a purely 
individual basis. For example, unemployment benefits may be combined with (increased) 
child benefit and other allowances. Additionally, of course, there may be the income of other 
household members, including its impact on benefit entitlement and vice versa. Also relevant 
in this context is the role of taxation. In most instances, the level of income protection that 
people actually receive in various situations is determined by a complex interaction between 
social security, social assistance and taxation. 
It is nevertheless interesting and relevant to consider trends. OECD time series on net 
replacement rates for the unemployed provide strong indications of reduced cash support for 
the unemployed between 1995 and 2005 (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). Seven of the 10 
countries recorded declining NRRs. Finland and Germany saw the biggest reductions in net 
replacement rates. Changes for the unemployed in most countries tended to be less damaging 
(or, sometimes, more beneficial) for families with children. The largest relative income drop 
was generally faced by long-term unemployed jobseekers who mostly rely on unemployment 
assistance or social assistance for income support. 
In the remainder of this section we will focus in somewhat more detail on institutional 
indicators of minimum income protection because adequate protection against severe 
financial poverty is arguably the first duty of the welfare state and also because poverty relief 
is the prime focus of this chapter. Such a focus is further desirable because the design 
features of tax and benefits systems, and especially the way various programmes interact in 
specific situations, tend to be so complex that they are not accurately and validly captured in 
a limited number of parameters. Minimum income protection provisions also mark the 
ground floor of other income maintenance provisions; minimum social insurance levels and 
minimum wages are almost always above the level of the social safety net. In that sense 
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indicators of minimum income protection also tell us something about the generosity of other 
income maintenance provisions.  
We draw on the CSB Minimum Income Protection Indicators (MIPI) dataset. In this 
dataset net income packages are calculated using the so-called model family approach, where 
the income package of households in various situations (varying by household composition 
and income levels) in simulated, taking into account all relevant benefits for which such 
households are eligible and also taking into account taxes. The MIPI database is among the 
most comprehensive data bases available in terms of geographic and longitudinal scope, as 
well as in terms of the range of household situations and income components. It is worth 
pointing out that such institutional indicators have their limits too. They are calculated for a 
limited number of family types and situations. The assumption is that there is full take up of 
benefits and that people effectively and immediately receive what they are entitled to. In the 
case of minimum wages the assumption is these are fully enforced. However, this is not 
always the case and this is one reason why the observed relationship between generosity 
levels as reflected in these indicators and outcomes is relatively weak. 
Van Mechelen and Marchal (2013) have analyzed patterns and trends in the level of 
minimum income protection for able bodied citizens in the European countries. The chief 
focus is on means-tested benefits providing minimum income protection, usually in the form 
of social assistance. These general means-tested benefits provide cash benefits for all or 
almost all people below a specified minimum income level. In some countries separate 
schemes exist for such groups as newly arrived migrants or the disabled. The empirical 
analyses use data from the CSB-Minimum Income Protection Indicators dataset (CSB-MIPI) 
and cover social assistance developments in 25 European countries and three US States. The 
study shows that the minimum income benefit packages for the able bodied in Europe have 
become increasingly inadequate in providing income levels sufficient to raise households 
above the EU at-risk-of poverty rate, defined as 60 per cent of median equivalent income in 
each country (Figure 4). The overall tendency for 1990s was one of almost uniform erosion 
of benefit levels, relative to the development of wages. This downward trend in the relative 
income position of families in receipt of social assistance changes somewhat in the 2000s, 
when the erosion of the level of benefit packages came to a halt in a number of countries. In a 
few countries there is even evidence of a partial reversal of the declining trend, thus 
somewhat strengthening the income position of able bodied persons that are in receipt of 
social assistance benefits. During the crisis period in particular a small number of countries 
have taken took extra steps to increase protection levels (Marchal, Marx and Van Mechelen, 
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2014). Despite a number of positive developments, net incomes of minimum income 
recipients continue to fall well short of the EU’s at risk of poverty threshold in all but a few 
EU countries. The size of the gap between the level of the social safety net and the poverty 
threshold varies across countries and family types, but it is generally quite substantial. 
 
[Figure 4. Net minimum income packages, 2009, EU Member States] 
 
While the erosion of minimum income protection levels seems to have slowed the fact 
remains that Europe’s final safety nets offer inadequate protection in all but a handful of 
countries. This begs the question: why are social safety nets not more adequate? Let us 
briefly consider two potential impediments: first, “adequate social safety nets are not 
affordable” and second, “adequate social safety nets undermine the work ethic and people’s 
willingness to work”.  
Are adequate social safety nets too costly? Final safety net provisions (social 
assistance schemes) generally constitute only a fraction of total social transfer spending 
(typically well below 2.5 percent of GDP in Europe, except in Ireland and the UK), the bulk 
of outlays going to pensions, unemployment and disability insurance, child benefits and other 
benefits. Vandenbroucke et al. (2013) have made tentative calculations showing that the 
redistributive effort required to lift all equivalent household incomes to the 60% level would 
be below 2.5 per cent of aggregate household income in most European countries and 
nowhere higher than 3.5 per cent. The countries that would have to make such a relatively 
great effort are all Southern and Eastern Member States. Vandenbroucke et al. (2013) also 
show that it is not the case that being poor in GDP per capita always implies a great 
redistributive effort to close the poverty gap: the Czech Republic and Hungary are relatively 
poor in terms of GDP per capita, but closing the poverty gap would require relatively little 
effort. On the other hand, Denmark and the UK have much higher living standards, yet they 
would have to make a relatively sizeable effort to close the poverty gap. Such a mechanical 
calculation ignores incentive effects and behavioural change (more poor people may prefer 
social assistance to low-paid jobs; the non-poor may reduce their work effort). The real cost 
of such an operation is probably higher than the mechanical effect and the calculation may be 
seen as indicating a lower boundary for the distributive effort that is required. Still, the 
calculation also illustrates that the cost of an adequate social safety net is not necessarily 
outside of the realm of the conceivable. 
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Are adequate social safety nets compatible with work incentives? Despite widespread 
and sometimes strongly worded concerns over the potential work disincentive effects of 
social safety nets empirical studies tell a more nuanced story (Immervoll, 2012). The income 
gap between situation of full-time dependence on minimum income benefits and a full-time 
job at the minimum wage (or the lowest prevailing wage) is in fact quite substantial in most 
European countries, especially for single persons. In some countries and under certain 
circumstances particular groups like lone parents with young children gain relatively little 
from moving into a low-paid job, especially when child care costs are accounted for. Partial 
transitions into work – moving to a small part-time job – also do not pay in certain 
circumstances. But generally speaking it is hard to argue that long-term dependence on social 
assistance benefits is an attractive financial proposition in most of Europe. The hypothetical 
Europe-wide introduction of social assistance minimums equal to 60% of median income 
would however create a financial inactivity trap in many countries, as is also brought out by 
the paper by Vandenbroucke et al. (2013). In countries like Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia and 
Lithuania, the net income of a single benefit recipient would be between 25% and 30% higher 
than the equivalent income of a single person working at minimum wage; in Spain and the 
Czech Republic, the relative advantage of the benefit claimant would amount to around 15 
per cent. This implies if such countries would wish to move towards better final safety net 
provisions that then minimum income floors would have to be raised at least in step. 
This would require quite substantial increases in minimum wages. In 2013, twenty 
Member States of the European Union have a national minimum wage, set by government, 
often in cooperation with or on the advice of the social partners, or by the social partners 
themselves in a national agreement. As is illustrated in Figure 5, presenting figures for 2010, 
only for single persons and only in a number of countries do net income packages at 
minimum wage level (taking into account taxes and individual social security contributions, 
but also social benefits) reach or exceed the EU’s at-risk-of poverty threshold, as in all graphs 
set at 60 per cent of median equivalent household income in each country. For lone parents 
and sole breadwinners with a partner and children to support, net income packages at 
minimum wage are below this threshold almost everywhere, usually by a wide margin. This 
is the case despite shifts over the past decade towards tax relief and additional income 
support provisions for low-paid workers (Marx, Marchal and Nolan, 2013). 
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[Figure 5. Gross minimum wages and net incomes at minimum wage as a percentage of the 
relative poverty threshold, 2010, selected EU Member States plus United States (New 
Jersey)] 
 
When it comes to the question of whether and to what level minimum wages and 
hence minimum income benefits in general could be increased, opinions clearly diverge. 
Concerns about work disincentive effects of social safety nets are legitimate, as are concerns 
over potential negative employment effects of minimum wages, especially if these were to be 
set at levels high enough to keep households solely reliant on that wage out of poverty. The 
fact remains, however, that countries like Denmark or the Netherlands combine what are 
comparatively among the highest levels of minimum protection for workers and non-workers 
alike with labour market outcomes that on various dimensions are also among the best in the 
industrialised world. The Netherlands and Denmark enjoy among the highest employment 
rates in Europe and the lowest (long-term) unemployment rates.  
Elaborate active labour market policies, specifically activation efforts directed at 
social assistance recipients, coupled with intensive monitoring and non-compliance 
sanctioning, appear to play a key role here. But it appears that the strength of overall labour 
demand is a key contextual factor for such associated policies and practices to effectively 
result in low levels of long-term dependence. Moreover, in terms of quality of employment, 
Denmark and the Netherlands are clearly among the best performers in the Europe with 
relatively few workers in low quality jobs (European Commission, 2008). Replicating the 
activation, empowerment and sanctioning aspects associated with comparatively generous 
systems may well be difficult enough in itself. Replicating a context where job growth is 
strong and where jobs are sufficiently rewarding and attractive may be even more difficult.  
Relatively elevated social safety nets and other income protection systems can be 
compatible with well-functioning labour markets. In fact, such systems may actually 
conducive to well-functioning labour markets. Flexicurity proponents identify adequate social 
security benefits as an essential flexicurity pillar in that adequate benefits stimulate and 
accommodate labour market transitions and to reduce risk aversion among workers (Bekker 
and Wilthagen, 2008). 
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2.3 Child Poverty and Child Cash Transfers  
Children are generally at a higher risk of poverty than the population as a whole 
(Tarki, 2010; Atkinson and Marlier, 2010; Tarki, 2011). In addition, child poverty trends 
have for the most part not been favorable over the past decade (see also Chapter 9 in this 
Handbook). The latest 2010 EU SILC data shows that between 2005 and 2010 the at-risk-of-
child poverty rate increased in 17 out of 29 countries (EU27 plus Iceland and Norway). Child 
poverty rates rose in all the Nordic countries, Germany and France. In most countries where 
child poverty fell this was in part the result of a fall in the 60% of median income threshold 
due the recession (Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal). Poverty 
gaps (the gap between net income and the poverty threshold) for children have also risen 
between 2005 and 2010 in 15 out of the 29 countries. This deteriorating situation is of course 
the result of rising unemployment. However in 2010 the majority of countries in the 
European Union have more than 20% of poor children living in households with all working 
age members in employment (work intensity of 1) and all but Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland and the UK have more than half of their poor children 
living in households with a work intensity of 0.5 or over (Van Mechelen and Bradshaw, 
2013). 
There are a number of reasons why children are living in poverty when their parents 
are employed. One explanation is that their earnings are too low either because they are 
working part time and/or full-time but their wage is low. The second explanation is that 
families may be taxed into poverty – the direct taxes taken in income tax and social insurance 
contributions reduces their gross incomes so much that they fall below the poverty threshold. 
The third explanation is that the cash benefits paid by the state to help parents with the costs 
of raising children are inadequate. Finally the reason why a child with a working parent may 
be poor is that after having paid for housing and other charges the resources available for 
consumption are too little. 
Countries use different mixes of tax benefits and cash benefits for delivering help to 
families with children. One can distinguish between income related and universal – i.e. non-
income related – cash benefits. Income related benefits aim to target direct cash transfers to 
low income families. Governments may decide to target benefits to other specific groups, for 
example lone parents or disabled children. Tax instruments are also used to redistribute 
income from childless families to families with dependent children – either in the form of tax 
allowances or tax credits specifically aimed at families with children. Tax allowances are 
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deducted from taxable income whereas tax credits are subtracted from the amount of tax due. 
Tax credits may be wasteable or non-wasteable. Non-wasteable or refundable tax credits are 
tax benefits that can be paid as cash transfer to the taxpayer whenever the benefit exceeds tax 
liability. Wasteable tax credits can only be used if tax liability is positive. Both cash and tax 
benefits tend to vary by the age and the number of children (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Van 
Lancker et al 2012).  
Child benefit packages as a whole play an important role in preventing against 
financial poverty. Nevertheless, in many countries child benefit packages fail to protect low 
wage earners against poverty. In all countries the incomes of single earner couples on 
minimum wages is below the poverty line. The child benefit package for a lone parent is 
more generous in most countries. However, how and whether child care costs are subsidised 
makes a big difference to the package especially for lone parents. The costs of childcare can 
undermine the value of the package in some countries. Whereas during the 1990s child 
benefit package have been able to escape welfare erosion, over the past decade the value of 
the package relative to median equivalised income has fallen in more countries than it has 
increased (Van Mechelen and Bradshaw, 2013). This trend of decreasing child benefits has 
affected both low paid families and the better off. 
Various studies have looked in detail at the structure of the child benefit package (e.g. 
Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Bradshaw, 2006; 2010, Corak et al. (2005), Matsaganis et al. 
(2005), Van Lancker et al. (2012) have documented the adequacy of child support 
arrangements in terms of poverty alleviation using empirical income surveys. Corak, Lietz 
and Sutherland (2005) find that universal child related benefits that also have some degree of 
targeting at the poorest protect best against poverty. Their conclusion that targeting within 
universalism yields the best outcomes is echoed by Van Mechelen and Marchal (2013). They 
find that cross-country variation in the level of child benefit packages for single earner 
families on low pay largely overlaps with the degree of low income targeting. Model family 
type simulations suggest that comparatively generous packages for low paid workers are to 
be found in countries where financial help for families with children is well-targeted at low-
income households by means of income-related cash benefits, refundable income-related tax 
credits or social assistance top-ups. However, model family type simulation effectively 
assume full-take up of benefits and full granting of rights. In reality selective benefit systems 
may be quite ineffective with regard to poverty alleviation due to take-up problems and 
labour market disincentives (Atkinson, 1998; Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983; Gassman and 
Notten, 2008). Van Mechelen and Bradshaw (2013) also show that child benefit packages are 
 33 
often also above average in countries with universal cash benefits, but combined with 
income-related cash benefits, housing allowances or supplementary benefits from social 
assistance (Ireland, France, Austria, Finland). This finding may in effect confirm and 
reinforce the assertion in empirical literature that that targeting may be not so bad, if 
embedded in a universal social insurance context (Skocpol, 1991; Whiteford, 2008; 
Kenworthy, 2011; Van Lancker et al., 2012). 
 
2.4 The Working Poor and Combating In-work Poverty  
The issue of in-work poverty has received increased attention recently (Andreβ and 
Lohmann, 2008; Lohmann, 2009; OECD, 2008; European Foundation, 2010; Fraser et al., 
2011; Crettaz, 2011; Maitre et al. 2012; Marx and Nolan, 2013). It is usually linked to the 
growth of low-paid insecure employment in the service sector. The contrast is often drawn 
with the golden years of welfare capitalism when manufacturing industry provided stable, 
well-paid employment even for those with little or no formal education. As Esping-Andersen 
et al. (2002) put it: “We no longer live in a world in which low-skilled workers can support 
the entire family. The basic requisite for a good life is increasingly strong cognitive skills and 
professional qualifications… Employment remains as always the sine qua non for good life 
chances, but the requirements for access to quality jobs are rising and are likely to continue to 
do so.’ By the same token, Bonoli (2007: 496) states: ‘Postindustrial labour markets are 
characterized by higher wage inequality with the result that for those at the bottom end of the 
wage distribution, access to employment is not a guarantee of a poverty-free existence.’ 
At the same time that good jobs for the less skilled are becoming scarcer an increased 
policy emphasis on activation has become evident in many European countries, certainly at 
the level of rhetoric, and gauging by some indicators also in terms of actual policy (Barbier 
and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004; Kenworthy, 2008; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2008; OECD, 
2007). Within the broad set of activation strategies deployed, an important number 
specifically target the long-term unemployed, including social assistance recipients. And 
within this set an important number of measures are aimed at stimulating these people, who 
generally have low levels of educational attainment, into relatively low-paid/minimum wage 
level jobs.  
So has in-work poverty become more prevalent? The literature on the working poor 
employs a variety of definitions, based on different approaches of what is meant by ‘poor’ 
and by ‘working’ (for an overview see: Nolan and Marx, 2000, Crettaz and Bonoli, 2010). 
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The working poor are conventionally defined and measured as those individuals who have 
been mainly working during the reference year (either in employment or self-employment) 
and whose household equivalised disposable income is below 60% of the median in the 
country in question. It is widely recognised that analysis of in-work poverty needs to 
distinguish between employees and the self-employed, both because their differing nature and 
because survey information on self-employment income is normally less reliable than wages 
and salaries, and also between full-time and part-time workers which is another important 
distinction. In fact, with the growth of part-time work, zero hours contracts, internships etc. 
‘being employed’ has become a very fuzzy heterogeneous concept indeed. Moreover, 
combining two levels of analysis – the individual’s labour market status and the household’s 
income (adjusted for household size) – inherently complicates interpretation, since the labour 
market status of other persons in the household, rather than that of the individual being 
considered, may be crucial, as may the number of dependent children if any. Using a year as 
the reference period for labour market status and income position also complicates 
interpretation: those working for part but not all of the year may be in poverty on an annual 
basis for that reason even if they were not poor while working – and how much of the year 
does one have to work to be counted as “working”? For these and other reasons, this 
definition/measure makes it difficult to identify the different factors potentially underlying 
the phenomenon and thus the locus(es) of policy failure, which could include: low 
(household) work intensity; inadequate out-of-work benefits; inadequate earnings; inadequate 
earnings supplements, the number of dependent people (children) relative to income… 
Data from the EU-SILC database clearly shows that in-work poverty is a Europe-wide 
phenomenon. The prevalence of in-work poverty varies across EU countries the extent of in-
work poverty ranges from a low of 4-5 percent in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, The Netherlands and Slovenia up to 13-14 per cent in Greece and Spain and 17 per 
cent in Romania. On the basis of Eurostat figures, which combine data from ECHP and SILC, 
we can seek no general tendency for in-work poverty to have risen since the start of the 
century. Taking the time span from 2000 to 2010, in-work poverty is seen to have increased 
over the decade in countries such as Denmark, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, Romania and 
Sweden, but fell in as many countries. Abstracting altogether from the crisis period, 
comparison of 2000 with 2006 also fails to show a marked rise in in-work poverty in many 
countries. The common presumption of a rising trend is therefore not supported, by this data 
and indicator. However, the fact that the sources of data for 2000, unlike the later years, are 
not EU-SILC means that the trends shown has to be treated with some caution.  
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It is useful to relate these figures and trends to analysis by the OECD, providing a 
point of comparison and covers the decade from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (see OECD, 
2009). Drawing on a variety of sources but seeking to apply a uniform methodology, the 
OECD found in-work poverty to have increased substantially in EU countries such as 
Germany, The Netherlands and Luxembourg over this decade, but with some other countries 
such as Italy seeing substantial declines. The OECD figures also draw on different data 
sources and employ a different definition – in-work poverty being measured as households 
below 50 per (rather than 60) cent of median poverty threshold (with a different equivalence 
scale), and with “working” being captured at household rather than individual level by the 
presence of at least one person in work in the household. The study by Airio (2008) of the 
period 1970-2000 covering six OECD countries (and mostly based on data from the 
Luxembourg Income Study) concludes that it is difficult to find any common trend on in-
work poverty. These differences illustrate the care which must be exercised in drawing strong 
conclusions about levels and trends in in-work poverty across countries, since definitions, 
data and period covered can all affect the outcome.  
Which policy action, or set of policy actions, is most appropriate cannot be seen as 
entirely independent from normative notions that underlie the various ways the causes of 
working-age poverty in relation to work can be construed. Take for example a dual adult 
household with only one working adult and three dependent children. The male breadwinner 
has a low-paid job, yet is paid well above the minimum wage. Child benefits are limited. 
Whether their at risk of financial poverty status is construed as a problem of insufficient 
breadwinner earnings, or as a problem of partner non-participation, or as a problem of 
insufficient child support makes a fundamental difference as to what type of policy action is 
to be examined and possibly favoured. In the case of traditional breadwinner type households 
with insufficient earnings, the preponderance of opinion in Europe appears to be that this is to 
be seen as a matter of partner non-participation or under-participation. But other cases may 
be less clear-cut. Even if in-work poverty is construed as largely a problem of low household 
work intensity, the question arises what can be deemed to be sufficient level of work 
intensity. It is not self-evident that that this is to equal all working-age, work capable adults in 
the household to be in full-time work the whole year round. Societal norms may differ across 
countries. In the Netherlands, for example, a 4/5th job per adult appears to be closer to the 
norm of full-work intensity. Also, household composition may be deemed to matter. It is not 
self-evident that a lone parent with young children is expected to work full-year, full-time 
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before additional income support is to be considered legitimate if his or her earnings fall short 
of the poverty threshold. 
Poverty is to a large extent yet far from exclusively associated with low work 
intensity at the household level (see De Graaf-Zijl and Nolan, 2011; Vandenbroucke and 
Corluy, 2013). This brings into view a wide variety of potential policies that can help 
households to increase if not maximize their work intensity. These include policies aimed at 
boosting the demand for workers, and particularly the demand for people with low levels of 
education or weak work experience. Employer subsidies or reductions in employers’ social 
security contributions are an example here. At the supply side, policy can stimulate (e.g. 
through fiscal reform) or support (e.g. through child care) people to take up work or to 
increase working hours. What mix of policies will work best in a given context will depend 
on the composition of the low work intensity population and on the underlying causes of low 
work intensity. 
Yet, and this is crucial, it must be recognised that even if such policies succeeded in 
getting every single non-employed person into work, or every household to a level of full 
work intensity for that matter, (and all empirical evidence to date suggests this to be highly 
unlikely), this would not guarantee the elimination of poverty. What policy can do to help 
households in these circumstances is again likely to depend on such factors as the 
institutional and policy context in place, labour market conditions and the profile of the 
population in need of support. 
In some EU countries, and certainly outside of the EU, minimum wages remain non-
existent or low relative to average wages, but in a range of others they do suffice to keep 
single persons reliant on them out of poverty. Thus it would appear sensible for countries 
with non-existent or very low minimum wages to contemplate introducing or increasing 
these. However, the route of introducing or boosting minimum wages to the upper ranges 
currently prevailing in Europe (relative to average earnings) would, even in the absence of 
negative employment effects, not be sufficient to eradicate in-work poverty. Even in 
countries where minimum wages are comparatively high they do not suffice to keep sole 
breadwinner household out of poverty, especially when there are dependent others or 
children. Minimum wages have probably become inherently constrained in providing 
minimum income protection to sole breadwinner households, especially in countries where 
relative poverty thresholds have become essentially determined by dual earner living 
standards.  
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For low-earnings households, only direct household income supplements may offer a 
reasonable prospect to a poverty free existence, especially when there are dependent children. 
Such ‘in-work benefits’ are now often associated with Anglo-Saxon-type “tax credits” such 
as the EITC in the United States and the WTC in the United Kingdom. It is increasingly 
argued though that more effective redistribution will not come from augmenting/expanding 
the traditional channels of income support, for example more generous social insurance or 
social assistance levels, or from higher minimum wages. These are seen as not only as failing 
to address today’s social risks and needs, but as exacerbating underlying problems such as 
exclusion from the labour market and entrapment in passive benefit dependency. Worse, have 
are considered as standing in the way of innovative mechanisms of social protection that are 
pro-active and self-sufficiency enhancing, such as active labour market policies and services 
such as child care, and improved education and training. 
The option to consider, then, are other forms of (targeted) income supplements for 
households that provide some level of income protection but that are also conducive to labour 
market participation. As Kenworthy (2011) puts it, ‘Given the importance of employment and 
working hours for the market incomes of low-end households, policy makers must guard 
against programs that provide attractive benefits without encouraging or requiring 
employment. An ideal transfer would be one that both boosts the incomes of low-earning 
households and promotes employment by able working-aged adults. As it happens such a 
program exists. Referred to variously as “in-work benefit” or “employment-conditional 
earnings subsidy”, it is best exemplified by the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in the United 
Kingdom and the Earned Income Credit (EITC) in the United States”. (p. 44) 
Under these schemes households with low earnings do not pay taxes but instead they 
receive additional money through the tax system. In the United States, the 1993 expansion of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) turned it into the country’s pre-eminent anti-poverty 
program for families of working age. The United Kingdom has also implemented and 
extended several schemes (and in fact did so earlier than the US), culminating in the 
Universal Credit. Clearly, Anglo-Saxon style negative income taxes have been garnering 
increased interest of late. As Immervoll and Pearson (2009) note, “Even in the mid-1990s, 
twenty years after such schemes were first introduced in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, such schemes were seen as interesting but unusual [...] it seems reasonable to conclude 
that IWB schemes are now mainstream policies in many countries.”  
That is perhaps somewhat of an overstatement. Several European countries have 
contemplated introducing Anglo-Saxon-style tax credits, or have done so in some form. 
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Examples here include the ‘Prime Pour l’Emploi’ (PPE) and the Revenue de Solidarité 
Active (rSa) in France, the ‘Combination Credit’ in the Netherlands, and a “Low Wage Tax 
Credit” in Belgium. Yet the reality is that most of these schemes exhibit only a faint 
resemblance to the EITC or the WTC. Sweden has a scheme that goes by the same name in 
English as its American counterpart EITC. It was introduced in 2007, and was reinforced in 
2008, 2009 and 2010. The stated motive of the reform was to boost employment; in particular 
to provide incentives for individuals to go from unemployment to, at least, part-time work. 
The scheme is different from the American scheme in that it is a non-refundable tax credit. 
Also, because the tax unit in Sweden is the individual and not the household it works in effect 
as tax relief on low individual earnings. In that respect it is similar to personal social security 
contributions relief measures elsewhere.  
While tax-channelled in-work benefits targeted at households with low earnings 
remain of limited significance in most European countries, it is of course the case that many 
countries have child benefit systems that provide an additional income to workers and their 
families (Van Mechelen and Bradshaw, 2013). Child benefits have generally lost ground. For 
a couple with two children, the size of the child benefits package, expressed as a percentage 
of the gross minimum wage, declined in the majority of countries awarding these benefits. 
For lone parents with two children the trend was somewhat more favorable in a number of 
countries. The decline of child cash benefits, both in value as in their importance in net 
disposable income, is discussed more extensively in Van Mechelen and Bradshaw (2013). 
Interest in EITC type schemes remains strong however, in the public debate and in the 
academic literature (Kenworthy, 2011; Figari, 2011, Allègre and Jaerhling, 2011; Crettaz, 
2011; Marx et al., 2012; Aaberge and Flood, 2013). That interest seems entirely legitimate. 
The empirical evidence shows the American EITC, in combination with other policy reforms 
and several increases in the minimum wage, to have produced some significant results, 
including marked increases in labour market participation and declines in poverty among 
some segments of the population, especially single-parent households (Hotz and Scholz, 
2003; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). It needs to be noted, however, that these initial results 
happened in favourable economic circumstances, including strong labour demand and low 
unemployment. The relatively strong increases in labour supply of lone mothers in the 
American setting also resulted from welfare reform, notably the transformation of the social 
assistance scheme into a temporary support system with time limits on the duration of 
benefits. This clearly provided a strong push incentive, with the EITC acting as pull 
incentive. Not all who were forced out of passive dependence found their way to work. 
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(Grogger, 2003; 2004) In addition, as the survey by Holt (2011) brings out, there is 
considerable evidence of incomplete take-up (around 75 per cent according to some 
estimates), although exact estimates are hampered by the fact that there is no systematic 
tracking. 
There are potential downsides to subsidizing low paid work. While EITC is intended 
to encourage work, EITC-induced increases in labour supply may drive wages down, shifting 
the intended transfer toward employers. Rothstein (2010) simulates the economic incidence 
of the EITC under a range of supply and demand elasticities and finds that in all scenarios a 
substantial portion of the intended transfer to low income single mothers is captured by 
employers through reduced wages. The transfer to employers is borne in part by low skill 
workers who are not themselves eligible for the EITC. There is some empirical evidence that 
corroborates the potential wage erosion effect of EITC (Leigh, 2010; Chetty et al., 2013) 
Yet whether EITC type schemes can work elsewhere, as Kenworthy (2011) and others 
suggest, is not self-evident. The socio-demographic make-up of the US differs from that in 
most European countries; there are more single adult (and parent) households but also more 
multi-earner households. The dispersion in earnings is also much more compressed in most 
European countries, where, in addition, benefits are generally higher relative to wages 
(including minimum wages) and less subject to means-testing if they derive from social 
insurance. This also implies that benefit entitlements of household members are less 
interdependent, possibly weakening the potential impact on labour supply. Many countries 
have individual taxation, and the trend is away from joint taxation of couples. 
In order to be effective as an anti-poverty device and at the same time affordable 
within reasonable limits, such measures need to be strongly targeted. However, strong 
targeting at households with low earnings is bound to create mobility traps, which can only 
be avoided if taper-off rates are sufficiently flat. That comes at a very considerable cost if the 
lower end of the household earnings distribution is densely populated, as is the case in many 
European countries. This cost can only be avoided by making the amount of the tax credit 
itself smaller, but in that case the anti-poverty effect is reduced. Simulations by Bargain and 
Orsini (2007) for Germany, France and Finland, by Figari (2011) for four southern European 
countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) and by Marx et al. (2012) for Belgium shed 
doubt over the applicability of EITC type systems in other settings. In an earlier study, 
Bargain and Orsini (2007) investigated the effects on poverty of the hypothetical introduction 
of the British scheme (as it was in place in 1998) in Germany, France and Finland, using 
EUROMOD for 2001. They found that the anti-poverty effects of a UK type tax credit 
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(similar in design and relative overall spending) would be very small in these countries, 
especially relative to the budgetary cost. For Belgium, the hypothetical introduction of the 
UK’s WTC is shown to yield a limited reduction in poverty at the cost of possible weakened 
work incentives for second earners (Marx et al., 2012). Figari (2011) notes that the presence 
of extended families in southern Europe does not allow for such policies to be well targeted at 
the very poorest. Bargain and Orsini (2006) have concluded that “interest in such schemes is 
destined to fade away”. Whether that is true remains uncertain and indeed doubtful, but EITC 
type negative tax credits are not obviously suitable for wholesale emulation throughout 
continental Europe. In Germany, for example, the labour market has undergone some 
profound changes over the past decade. Low paid employment has become far more 
prevalent and in-work poverty seems to have increased. It is not unlikely that a simulation 
like the one performed by Bargain and Orsini on 2001 data would yield different results 
today. A recent study by Giannelli et al. (2013) analyse the quality of the new jobs created in 
Germany between 1998 and 2010 and find that the reforms of 2000’s (Hartz reforms) 
reinforced an existing trend of increasing wage inequality and lower wages among the least 
advantaged individuals. Although, as found by Card et al. (2013), a great deal of the increase 
of wage inequality in Germany for the period 1985-2009 is due to the increasing 
heterogeneity in job premiums and the raise of assortativeness in the matching between 
workers and establishments. 
Clearly, simulations demonstrate that in-work benefit schemes that work well in 
certain settings do not necessarily perform equally well in a different context. Family 
composition, individual earnings distributions and family income structures drive outcomes 
in a very substantial way. It remains to be explored whether alternative designs are 
conceivable that have better outcomes in continental European settings and that are 
realistically affordable. 
 
2.5 Pensions 
The terminology of ‘pillars’ is widely employed (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005) to capture the 
different elements of pension systems, as they operate within for example Bismarckian or 
Beveridgean welfare states. Bovenberg and Van Ewijk (2011) offer a typology of four 
models of pension systems based on the dimensions of governance (private vs. public) and 
individual choice (mandatory vs. voluntary), which are related to the classification of welfare 
states by Esping-Anderson (1990). As pension systems in rich economies have, 
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simultaneously or not, characteristics of social insurance and poverty prevention, and 
different forms to finance benefits, a more flexible taxonomy of pension systems is used by 
the OECD (see Figure 6). 
 
[Figure 6: Taxonomy of different types of retirement-income provision] 
 
There are three main visible tiers forming the retirement-income system. The first one is 
intended to prevent old-age poverty and is publicly financed. Within this tier there are basic 
benefits paid at a flat rate, resources-tested (means and assets) benefits, and minimum 
pensions. The second tier is composed by mandatory schemes that can be public or private. 
The public schemes offer defined benefits (DB) where the pension entitled is a function of 
individual contributed years and income. A system of points earned with each year income 
and accrued up to retirement age is also possible (e.g. occupational plans in France). A third 
plan under the public provision of the second tier is the Notional Defined Contributions 
(NDC), which is used in Italy, Norway, Poland and Sweden. Under this plan, the individual 
contributions are recorded by the pension institution and offered a return rate. Once the 
retirement age is reached such contributions are converted into pensions through an actuarial 
formula. The second tier also includes compulsory private (occupational) managed pensions 
which can be DB or defined contribution (DC) types. Finally, the third tier is composed by 
voluntary private plans. 
 The composition of each plan within and between countries varies to great extent. 
From 34 OECD countries, 14 have mandatory private schemes, 12 have public resources-
tested benefits, 13 have basic flat rate benefits and 18 have minimum pensions. Furthermore, 
DB pensions are present in 20 countries whilst DC pensions exist in 11 economies. For more 
details about the composition of pension plans by county, see section II.1 of OECD (2011). 
 
[Figure 7. Net pension replacement rates by pension schemes in OECD countries] 
 
The adequacy of pension benefits is broadly measured by the replacement rate, i.e. the ratio 
between pensions and average wages. Figure 7 reports the net pension replacement ratios in 
OECD countries with data from late 2000’s. On average, the replacement rate is 50% in 
mandatory public plans while it is 43% in mandatory private plans and 28% in voluntary 
plans. Overall, the mandatory systems show a replacement rate of 68% which rises to 77% 
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when voluntary plans are added. Furthermore, one can observe that adequacy differ 
significantly among countries and pension schemes. For example, in Japan, Korea and 
Mexico the overall net replacement rate is lower than 50% while in 13 over 34 countries this 
figure is above 80%. All the replacement ratio figures are lower when gross income and 
pensions are considered because income taxation burden for retirees is milder than for the 
working population. The mandatory systems have a gross replacement ratio of 57% and this 
reaches 64% when voluntary plans are included. 
Typically, individuals at the beginning and the end of the life-cycle face higher poverty rates. 
This U relationship by age groups has been maintained during the last decades, but the 
poverty rates have shifted impressively in favour of the elderly and in detriment of the 
children and young. Figure 8 from the OECD’s Unequal Growing?, shows clearly the sharp 
reduction of poverty risk for old-age individuals between 1970’s and 2000’s in OECD 
countries. Moreover, women report more poverty rates than for men. The poverty gap by 
gender significantly increases for older ages. As explained in OECD (2008), Smeeding and 
Sandstrom (2005) and Vignoli and De Santis (2010), the risk of living in poverty is higher for 
elderly women because they have gained less pension rights during their working life and 
they are more likely to live alone after the death of their spouses. In this regard, studies from 
Burtless (2009) and Vignoli and De Santis (2010) alert on the trends of new living 
arrangements (shrinking of the household size of the elderly) that jeopardize the living 
conditions of the elderly and increase the risk of falling into poverty. As a feedback 
mechanism, the larger participation of the elderly in pensions and transfers will allow them to 
live alone without the need of other relatives, increasing in this way the risk of poverty. 
McGarry and Davenport (1998) are also aware about the effects of survivorship benefits for 
pensions on the poverty rates of American widows given the scarcity of pension wealth of 
women. 
 
[Figure 8. Risk of relative poverty by age of individuals in OECD-7 countries 
(Poverty rate of the entire population in each year = 100)] 
 
The role of pensions in reducing poverty is particularly important due to the large share of 
old-age income coming from social security. On average, public transfers (earnings-related 
pensions, resource-tested benefits, etc.) to people over 65 during the mid-2000’s represent 
60% of their incomes, with some countries where this figure reaches 80% or more (France, 
Hungary, Slovak Republic and Belgium). The rest of the sources are divided in work income 
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(21%) and capital income (19%). The shares of incomes from work are large in Japan, 
Turkey Mexico and Korea where those represent about 50%. The average share of capital 
income for the elderly in Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, 
Denmark and United States, is about 41%. Note that occupational plans are included in 
capital income sources, so that this component includes pension incomes. All these figures by 
country can be consulted in OECD (2011). It is also observed that the reduction of market 
income poverty attained with transfers and taxes is greater for old-age people than working 
age people (OECD, 2008). 
A number of recent studies have sought to measure the contribution of pensions in 
reducing old-age poverty across countries. Smeeding and Williamson (2001) use LIS data to 
estimate the effect of public pensions on poverty rates of the elderly in eight developed 
economies for mid-1990s: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and United States. The poverty rate for old-age people would be 84% in average if 
only market income is considered. This is reduced to 71.8% when occupational pensions are 
added and then this falls to 21.2% when universal and social incomes are included. With 
social safety net transfers, the average poverty rate drops up to 13.2%. Different from the 
English-speaking countries, the greatest redistributive effects are found in France, Germany, 
Netherlands and Sweden. Similar trends are found when Smeeding and Sandstrom (2005) 
analyse data for early 2000s. In both works, it is found that pensions are more effective to 
reduce poverty of old-age males than that of females. With early 2000’s data, pensions, 
income social transfers and safety net transfers reduce poverty of elderly women up to 24.3% 
while that figure is reduced up to 13.3% for both sexes. As women participate to less extent 
in the pension system, the safety net transfers are more important for them to reduce their risk 
of poverty, and the contrary holds for occupational pensions in the case of men. In a similar 
exercise by Lefebvre (2007), it is found that poverty alleviation due to pensions is less 
effective for the very old (75+) than for the old (65-74). This feature combined with gender 
depicts a very negative picture for the very old women, who in turn, represent the majority of 
members in the oldest old cohort. Moreover, micro-simulation models like the one 
implemented in Dang et al (2006) arrive to similar conclusions. Chapter 26 of this Handbook 
show other relevant micro-simulation models.  
There is a concern about the sustainability of public pension expenditures due to the 
accelerated aging process in developed economies; and in particular, there is a legitimate 
worry about the effects of the reforms aiming to attenuate it on old-age poverty and 
inequality (Burtless, 2006; Börsch-Supan, 2012; Arza and Kohli, 2008). Although, as 
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indicated in the reports by Zaidi et al. (2006a, 2006b) the pension reforms promoted by the 
World Bank were mainly driven by financial sustainability issues and little concern was put 
on the effects on the living standards of the retirees. These reports are an important effort to 
estimate the long term effects of a variety of pension reforms in EU countries –undertaken 
between 1990’s and 2000’s- on the poverty and living standards of the elderly. In Zaidi et al. 
(2006b), the authors find a strong negative relationship between the generosity of public 
pensions and the at-risk-of-poverty rates among the 65+, and foresee a decline of the pension 
generosity (for years 2025 and 2050) on the basis of the analysis of each pension reform. 
These two combined findings will result in an increase of the poverty rate for the vast 
majority of countries analysed (Estonia, Malta, Austria, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden). Only Ireland and Cyprus 
appear to have a reduction of the 65+’s poverty rates. However, as warned by the authors, 
these results have to be taken with caution as no behavioural responses are considered.  
In a more static framework, Van Vliet et al. (2102) estimate the effects of pension reform on 
poverty and inequality in European countries. They acknowledge that recent shifts from 
public to private provision in pensions are still limited in Europe but it is important for some 
countries. They estimate the effects of those changes on old-age inequality and poverty with 
OLS panel data regressions, but they do not find substantial effects on those variables. 
Nonetheless, they cast the limitation of their analysis by indicating that the reforms may be 
affecting only to new and future retirees. 
Looking at the effects of public transfers and taxes in a more general way, some authors 
appeal for a rebalance of the spending from pension programs towards programmes aimed to 
prime age people and their children at the bottom of the income scale, which could reduce 
poverty rates to a greater extent (OECD, 2008). As pointed by Dang et al. (2006), social 
protection systems are very old-age oriented in EU with the elderly receiving much more 
cash transfers than the working population. They show that even high old-age spending 
countries can leave significant pockets of elderly in poverty while others with lower 
expenditures in old-age can be more successful at limiting the risk of poverty. Furthermore, 
their simulations indicate that there is scope to reorient the expenditures from old-age to 
working population and rebalance the tax liabilities in favour of the working population. 
These changes will not jeopardize the living standards of the elderly if the reforms include 
proper safety net measures. 
The role of public pensions in reducing inequality can be very large because these pensions 
represent a large fraction on income in old-age. During the mid-2000s, public cash benefits 
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accounted for 70% of income of retirement age individuals in 24 OECD countries, and in 
many of them the figure was above 80% (OECD, 2008). In countries where public pensions 
are important, the effect of re-ranking when one use the distribution of market or disposable 
income as the counterfactual can be large. Mahler and Jesuit (2006) find a sizeable effect of 
pensions (public and private) in reducing the Gini coefficient on 13 rich countries during the 
period 1980-2000. On average, the Gini is reduced from 0.43 to 0.27 when all taxes and 
transfers are considered, with a reduction of 0.039 points from taxes and 0.121 from transfers 
of which 0.068 comes from pensions, 0.013 from unemployment transfers and 0.040 from 
other transfers. In Belgium, Sweden and France, the reduction in the Gini is about 0.10 points 
due to pensions, while in US, Canada and Australia is only about 0.04 points. Lefebvre 
(2007) computes the marginal contribution of earnings, property income, private pensions 
and public transfers on total inequality in 19 EU countries. It is found that public pensions 
decrease inequality in all countries and that private pensions increase inequality in all 
countries but in Ireland and France. Similarly, Caminada et al. (2012) disentangle the changes 
of contributions of different income components in reducing inequality between mid-1980’s 
and mid 2000’s in 12 LIS countries. Around 1985 the primary income gini falls 0.139 points 
after transfers and taxes, while that around 2005 this drop is about 0.163 points. The authors 
estimate that this increase in redistribution is mainly due to the state old-age and survivor 
benefits, which account for 60% of the total change. Different designs of pension systems 
have diverse effects on inequality. For example, Benedict and Shaw (1995) with data from 
early 80’s, find that private pensions in US increase inequality among unionized workers by 
21% with respect to observed wage inequality. On the reforms undertaken in Europe since 
mid-1990s, Van Vliet et al. (2012) do not find evidence of important effects of those reforms 
on income inequality. 
In general, the assessment of inequality is made in one single year, but studies such as Butler 
(2006) emphasise that this approach can overestimate the redistributive impact of pensions. 
This is related to the question of what is the proper counterfactual distribution to use when 
one analyses the impact of pensions. If pensions are simply absent, it is expected that 
individuals will look for other forms of savings to afford their old-age. Different living 
arrangements can also be different if pensions would be non-existent or less generous, which 
will cause other redistributive effects (Burtless 2006, 2009). In this regard, some authors 
favour the estimation of the distribution of lifetime income (e.g. Liebman, 2002 and Deaton 
et al., 2002) although the data requirements are more demanding. This approach shares 
features with a growing literature studying lifetime income inequality (see for instance 
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Aaberge and Magne Mogstad (2012)) which highlights a life-cycle bias that over-estimates 
income inequality when only one or few years are analysed. 
Section 3: Beyond Social Protection 
3.1 Non-Cash Social Spending and Poverty 
While cash transfers form a substantial proportion of overall social expenditure and 
have a pronounced impact on household incomes and poverty, other forms of social 
expenditure – such as on health, housing, and perhaps education (which is sometimes 
included as ‘social’ spending and sometimes not) – may also have substantial direct and 
indirect effects. Table 4 shows spending on cash transfers and on other forms of social 
expenditure - which one can think of as benefits in kind from a household perspective – based 
on the OECD’s social expenditure database, before the onset of the economic crisis in 2007-8 
which has boosted expenditure on cash transfers in many countries. This shows that in about 
half the countries shown, cash transfers significantly outweighed such benefits in kind – 
notably in the ‘Continental/corporatist’ countries like France, Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, in the Southern countries Italy, Spain and Greece, and in Poland. However, in 
many of the other OECD countries overall social spending was fairly evenly balanced 
between cash transfers and other spending. This is using a definition of social expenditure 
that does not include education, so if one adds on education spending the relative importance 
of non-cash spending is even more obvious, as brought out in Marical, Mira d’Ercole, 
Vaalavuo and Verbist (2008). They conclude that public spending on health, education and 
‘other services’ in the OECD social expenditure database represent an amount comparable to 
public cash transfers, exceeding those transfers in 11 OECD countries.  
 
[Table 4. Social Expenditure Distinguishing Cash and Non-Cash Benefits as Percentage of 
GDP in OECD Countries, Mid-2000s] 
 
 The impact of such non-cash spending on poverty is difficult to assess, for various 
reasons (see for example Currie and Gahvari, 2008; Garfinkel, Tainwater and Smeeding, 
2006). One approach, employed in comparative studies such as Smeeding et al. (1993), 
Marical et al. (2008), Callan, Smeeding and Tsakloglou (2008), and Paulus, Sutherland and 
Tsakloglou (2010), and in national studies such as Aaberge and Langorgen (2006), Callan 
and Keane (2009), Nolan and Russell (2001), Harding, Warren and Lloyd (2006) and Wolff 
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and Zacharias (2007) is to use micro-data to assess who is benefitting from such expenditure 
and to what extent, and to compare overall inequality and (sometimes) poverty levels when 
this non-cash income is included – with some studies also allocating indirect taxes to 
households and deducting them to arrive at a ‘final’ income concept. Major decisions have to 
be made about how to value the benefits to users of services, as has been debated in the 
literature for three decades, and the empirical studies have shown that these can have a 
marked impact on the measured outcomes, notably in the case of health spending where 
particularly challenging conceptual issues have to be addressed.   
One complication is that services which in principle are provided free or in subsidised 
fashion to everyone may actually be readily available only in certain areas or to certain 
groups, or even if available may be taken up to a varying degree by those with higher versus 
lower levels of income or education. Information on actual use patterns may not always be 
available, and attributing a common value across for example a particular age group may then 
be misleading. Empirical studies thus make use, where possible, of information – generally 
from household surveys – of actual usage patterns for the range of services involved, but this 
may not cover all the areas of expenditure one wants to include.  
Difficulties then arise, though, first of all because one does not know whether 
households would have bought the same amount of the goods or services in question if those 
were not provided free or at a subsidised rate. Recipients may place a value on non-cash 
benefits that is less than what they would have to pay for the good or service in the market, 
because the recipient has no choice in its allocation. However, a US study of food stamps 
suggested that where the item is a basic necessity and the in-kind transfer is smaller than the 
amount the household would normally spend on that good, the value to the recipient may be 
very close to the market price (Moffitt, 1989). Unlike food, what is meant by market price for 
many of the services provided by the state may itself be unclear since they are not available 
in the market – the most obvious examples being defense or law enforcement. If one takes the 
supply price (i.e. the cost to government) as the point of reference, the optimal level of 
provision will equate the marginal benefit with this price times the marginal cost of public 
funds. In any case, the widely-used approach in empirical studies is simply to assume that the 
value of a particular (unit of a) service is equal to the average cost of producing it. Use of 
such an average may mask variations in quality of the service provided to different socio-
economic groups – for example in the quality of the healthcare provided to the rich versus the 
poor – and that is another important aspect that is very difficult to capture empirically.  
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The second general issue arises where the non-cash benefit covers something like 
health care, which is required to meet a specific contingency affecting only some households 
in a given year. In those circumstances, if we simply add the cost of the free or subsidised 
services supplied to the households consuming them, sick people will be richer than the 
healthy at any cash income level. One can in those circumstances attempt to also take the 
additional ‘needs’ of such persons into account by elaboration of the equivalence scales 
employed – drawing on for example recent studies focused on the costs associated with 
disability such as Jones and O’Donnell (1995), Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) – but this remains 
underdeveloped. A more widely-employed approach is that instead of basing values on the 
household’s own consumption, one attributes to all those eligible for State provision an extra 
income equal to the insurance premium they would have to pay to obtain the same level of 
cover in the market. Even assuming the cost of this cover can be established satisfactorily, a 
serious problem remains however. Even the insurance value could be worth enough by itself 
to bring a household above the poverty threshold, when they might still have insufficient cash 
income to buy enough food, clothing or shelter, reinforcing the point that the in-kind transfer 
does not represent command over resources in the same way that cash income does. 
Furthermore, even with the insurance approach the fact that different households have 
different underlying needs should be taken into account in arriving at conclusions about the 
welfare implications of in-kind benefits (on which see Aaberge et al., 2010). 
The final, and fundamental, issue to be noted relates to the time-period employed. In 
measuring poverty and income inequality annual income is most often the focus, but in 
thinking about the consumption of education or health care and the value of the in-kind 
benefit they represent it would be natural to take a life-cycle approach, since the benefits are 
often long-term rather than confined to the point of use. Such an approach is both very 
demanding in data terms and involves a wide range of assumptions for which it is difficult to 
find a robust empirical basis.  
The results of recent empirical studies on this topic are of significant interest in the 
broader context of welfare state institutions and policies and their impact on poverty. Marical, 
Mira d’Ercole, Vaalavuo and Verbist (2006 – and also Chapter 9 in OECD, 2008) look at the 
impact of public spending on health, education and social housing on income inequality in 
OECD countries, concluding that they generally contribute to narrowing inequality, though 
not usually by as much as cash transfers and direct taxes combined; they do not look at 
corresponding results for poverty. Paulus, Sutherland and Tsakloglou (2010) on the other 
hand assess the impact of valuing non-cash or in-kind benefits from public housing subsidies, 
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education and healthcare in five European countries, recalculating both inequality and 
relative poverty measures when this value is added to cash income. In such an exercise, 
importantly, the relative income poverty threshold – in this case 60% of median equivalised 
income - is itself recalculated, rising by between about one-fifth and one-third in value when 
in-kind benefits are included. The proportion of persons falling below that threshold is found 
to be much lower than the corresponding figure based on cash income in all five countries, 
that reduction being greatest in the UK where the poverty rate falls by half and least in 
Greece where it still falls by a third. There are also major impacts on the composition of those 
falling below the threshold, with the reduction in poverty ate greatest for children and older 
people (since the incidence of spending on education and health care is particularly 
concentrated on them). This pattern is familiar, having featured strongly in Smeeding et al.’s 
(1993) early comparative study covering seven countries based on data in LIS.  
Sutherland et al. caution that ‘it is doubtful whether these results should be interpreted 
as having any bearing on the assessment of poverty or inequality from a welfare perspective’ 
(p. 259), being mainly of interest in showing the scale of noncash incomes relative to cash 
incomes, but without taking into account the needs of individuals for health care or education. 
The study goes on to attempt to take the variation in those needs into account via modifying 
the equivalence scales employed, and finds that the distributional effects of noncash transfers 
on several summary income inequality measures are then far more modest; corresponding 
results for poverty rates are not reported, but it seems likely that the same would be true in 
that case. It is also worth highlighting the argument by Bourguignon and Halsey (2007) that 
once the inter-temporal or intergenerational nature of the effects of many social expenditures 
are recognized, it is no longer possible to assume that they are equivalent to cash transfers, 
food subsidies, and other programs of direct redistribution. Education spending is an 
investment in future generations and may have redistributive effects for these generations, but 
may worsen distribution initially. Moral hazard makes it infeasible to borrow against the 
human capital of one’s descendants, so an increase in public education expenditures financed 
by an increase in a neutral tax may actually be regressive for the generations with school-age 
children. Poor households in this generation pay the tax and receive no benefit, whereas rich 
households pay the tax but may recover it through intergenerational reallocation of 
consumption (that is, smaller bequests to their children). Intergenerational accounting may 
then be necessary to more fully capture the redistributive and poverty-related effects. 
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3.2 The Labour Market, Education, and Active Labour Market Policy  
Income derived from the labour market is central to the overall distribution of income, and to 
poverty and disadvantage at household level (see for example OECD, 2008). Even for those 
not currently earning (via employment or self-employment), previous labour market 
experience may determine current entitlement to social protection or to occupational 
pensions. A very wide variety of studies of poverty in individual countries, both descriptive 
and econometric, find that those in work are much less likely to be poor than the unemployed 
or working-age inactive. Cross-country differences in labour market performance and 
structure then seem a natural starting point in seeking to understand cross-country variation in 
poverty rates (Burniaux et al., 1998; Förster and D’Ercole, 2005). The poverty rate among the 
working-age population varies greatly across OECD countries and is indeed the main 
contributor to overall poverty headcounts (see for example OECD, 2009). However, at the 
country level working-age poverty – overall or for specific groups – is not in fact strongly 
linked to employment rates. Burniaux et al. (2006) report some relationship between female 
participation rates and poverty rates across OECD countries, but it is not particularly strong. 
Poverty rates are generally lower in low unemployment countries and vice versa, but there 
are notable exceptions, and a high employment rate is not a sufficient condition for low 
poverty among the working aged population. At the aggregate level, then, employment 
performances are not the main driver of cross-country differences in the overall poverty risk 
among the working-age population (OECD, 2009). 
There is thus a contrast between micro-studies on poverty and the labour market in 
individual countries, which tend to focus on the labour market situation and experience of 
individuals and their households and the characteristics associated with good rather than bad 
labour market outcomes for them, and comparative studies at the aggregate level which focus 
on labour market institutions and performance. The relationship between individual 
characteristics and labour market outcomes is of course a core concern of labour market 
research, as is the structure of earnings in terms of overall dispersion and differentials. (For 
reviews see for example the Handbook of Labour Economics (Ashenfelter and Layard, 1987, 
Ashenfelter and Card, 1999, 2011), Blau and Kahn 2008, and Chapter 19 of the present 
volume by Checchi and Salverda). The extent to which individual disadvantage and relatively 
bad labour market outcomes manifest themselves in high poverty rates then depends on the 
household, labour market and institutional settings in which those disadvantages are 
experienced. Comparative studies of the relationship between poverty and the labour market 
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at the aggregate level include collective bargaining structures, the role of unions, minimum 
wages etc. in the explanatory variables employed as key aspects of labour market institutions 
(see for example Burniaux et al., 2006). These may often be embedded in wider sets of 
variables covering for example welfare spending and structures, intended not only to serve as 
controls but also to capture broader concepts of the welfare state ‘regime’, as discussed in 
Section 1.4 above. This reflects a recognition that labour market institutions, while central, 
are inextricably bound up with the broader welfare state, and that the impact on poverty of for 
example a minimum wage will vary depending on that broader context – as brought out in 
our discussion of in-work poverty and social protection transfers in Section 2.4.   
A core element of that broader welfare state, strongly linked to the labour market, is 
the education system and educational spending. Once again a contrast may be drawn between 
micro-studies on the relationship between educational attainment, earnings and poverty at 
individual or household level, and studies at the aggregate level which focus on the education 
system and spending and their impact on economic performance and poverty. The 
relationship between educational attainment and earnings/labour market outcomes for 
individuals has been a major preoccupation of labour market research since the earnings 
equation first derived by Mincer (1958) became a basic tool of analysis, but the broader role 
of education as a facilitator or engine of economic growth is also a major focus of research. 
The concept of ‘human capital’ has become embedded since the ‘Chicago School’ of 
economics (see especially Mincer, 1958; and Becker, 1964), with human capital seen as 
similar to physical means of production in that investment in enhancing capacities and skills, 
notably through education and training, also increases future productive capacity. Micro-
economic investigation of this relationship via estimation of the returns accruing to the 
individual in terms of earnings is the topic of a vast array of empirical economic research, 
including investigation of the extent to which the positive earnings differentials for the more 
educated may be interpreted as a causal impact of education itself rather than selection (on 
which see for example Card, 1999, Machin, 2008). The impact of educational attainment on 
the likelihood of being in poverty is also a consistent finding from micro-econometric 
analysis of individual OECD countries or comparatively, and holds whether poverty is 
measured in terms of low annual income, persistent low income, or levels of deprivation (see 
for example Layte and Whelan (2002); Fouarge and Layte, 2005), though the relative and 
absolute ‘penalty’ paid for low educational attainment in terms of enhanced poverty risk 
varies substantially across countries.  
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The implications of this individual-level link between educational attainment and 
poverty risk for aggregate performance and for policy is not as straightforward as it is often 
taken to be, and requires further research. Improving the education and skills of the 
workforce has assumed a central role in strategies to promote economic growth and tackle 
poverty and exclusion. This is illustrated for example by the European Union’s 2013 Social 
Investment Package, focused on policies designed to strengthen people’s skills and 
capacities, including education and childcare as well as active labour market policies (see 
European Commission, 2013), or in a US context by the Obama administration highlighting 
that “To prepare Americans for the jobs of the future and help restore middle-class security, 
we have to out-educate the world and that starts with a strong school system.”7 This reflects 
in particular the concern that the low-skilled in advanced economies are being left behind by 
rapid technological change in a globalized world economy, as discussed in depth in for 
example Freeman (2008) and Chapter 21 by Kanbur in this volume. On the role of education 
in this context, OECD (2011) concludes for example that between the mid-1980s and mid-
2000s the sizeable disequalising effect on earnings of factors such as technological change, 
more flexible labour market regulation and less generous unemployment insurance was 
largely offset by growth in average educational attainment, up-skilling serving to reduce 
wage dispersion among workers and increase employment rates.  
However, the corollary is not that continued expansion in education per se will be 
effective as an equalising or anti-poverty policy. As Checchi et al. (2014) emphasise, 
increasing average levels of educational attainment was associated with reducing dispersion 
in attainment in many OECD countries over the 20th. century, but with completion rates at 
second level approaching saturation in many rich countries, the main issue facing educational 
policies in most OECD countries now is whether they should pursue further expansion at 
tertiary level. Such expansion, depending on how it is brought about and underpinned, may 
not benefit those from poorer backgrounds, as we discuss in the context of intergenerational 
transmission of disadvantage in the next section. Research on how best to enhance skills in 
the middle and bottom parts of the distribution in secondary school, including performance in 
mathematics and languages, as well as issues of school system structures, tracking, and early 
childhood education, discussed in the next section are thus also central to the research agenda 
from a poverty perspective.  
                                                 
7 http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education, downloaded 25 July 2013. 
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Training and skill enhancement, as well as matching, are important components of the 
active labour market programmes and activation strategies that are now widely seen as at the 
core of anti-poverty policies (see for example OECD 2009, European Commission 2013). 
These have been the subject of a very substantial research literature, covering the evaluation 
of the impact of specific interventions and of active labour market policies more broadly – for 
reviews see for example Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, (1999), OECD (2005, 2007b), Card, 
Kluve and Weber (2010), Kluve (2010). The general thrust of these evaluations, when carried 
out rigorously, was not particularly positive for a time – as reflected in for example Richard 
Freeman’s summary that “Random assignment social experiments analysed with care …. 
have shown us that one favourite solution to labour market problems—training and other 
active labour market measures—have at best only modest effects on outcomes” (Freeman, 
1998: 16). More recent evaluations have been more positive in tone, with OECD (2009) for 
example concluding that activation programmes can have a significant impact on 
unemployment. Card, Kluve and Weber’s (2010) meta-analysis of microeconometric 
evaluations yields particularly interesting findings from both a substantive and 
methodological point of view. They find subsidized public sector employment programs to 
have the least favourable impact estimates, whereas job search assistance programs have 
relatively favourable short-run impacts, and classroom and on-the-job training programs tend 
to show better outcomes in the medium-run than the short-run, and programs for youths are 
less likely to yield positive impacts than untargeted programs. Methodologically, they find 
that – controlling for the outcome measure and the type of program and participants – 
experimental and non-experimental studies have similar impact estimates, suggesting that the 
research designs used in recent non-experimental evaluations are unbiased. They also note 
that the outcome variable used to measure program effectiveness matters, with evaluations 
based on registered unemployment durations are more likely to show favourable short-term 
impacts. The outcome variable is also clearly very important from a poverty perspective: it 
cannot be taken for granted that success in terms of a transition from unemployment into 
employment, even if sustained, leads to an escape from poverty – since not all those 
benefitting may have been in poverty when unemployed, and for those who were the increase 
in income involved after taxes and withdrawal of benefits may not suffice to lift the 
household above a poverty threshold, as discussed at some length in Section 3 above. The 
rigorous evaluation of active labour market programmes in terms of their impact on poverty 
remains a major gap to be filled.  
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As is noted in Card, Kluve and Weber’s (2010), active labour market programmes are 
widely diverse. An effort to categorize these policies in relation to their political determinants 
is made by Bonoli (2012) on the basis of national variation across OECD economies, but he 
found little regularity over time in these determinants, with a mix of leftist and centrist 
political parties in each period advocating active labour market policies. Moreover, Bruno 
and Rovelli (2010) compare and document differences in labour market policies in EU 
countries in 2000’s and find that in general higher rates of employment are associated with 
more expenditure on active labour market programs for countries with a larger share of the 
population embracing pro-work attitudes. Recently, an OECD (2013) study analysing 
activation programs in OECD countries and with more detail in Ireland, UK, Japan, Norway, 
Finland, Switzerland and Australia brings out the different responses of expenditures on 
activation programs after the economic crisis, finding it difficult to establish a common 
pattern. 
 
3.3 Intergenerational Transmission, Childhood and Neighbourhoods 
The intergenerational transmission of poverty and disadvantage continues to be a core 
concern both for research and policy. Research on income mobility across the distribution is 
the topic of Chapter 11 by Jäntti and Jenkins, but here it is important to reiterate that there is 
substantial evidence from country-specific studies that mobility is particularly limited 
towards the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy, so that poverty is to a significant degree 
inherited across generations. Examples from research in the United States include Wilson 
(1987), Gottschalk et al. (1994), Duncan, Brooks-Gunn and Klebanov (1994), Duncan and 
Brooks-Gunn (1997), Duncan et al. (1998), and Corcoran (2001); for Canada, see Corak 
(2001); recent U.K. studies include Sigle-Rushton (2004) and Blanden and Gibbons (2006), 
and similar studies that trace current poverty or disadvantage to conditions in childhood exist 
for other rich countries. The likelihood of welfare recipiency is also seen to be associated 
across generations – see for example Corak (2004) for Sweden and Canada and Page (2004) 
for the United States.  
OECD (2009) concludes that variation in the strength of transmission of poverty 
across countries cannot reliably be assessed with the available evidence. However, the 
findings of Jäntti et al. (2006) showing considerably greater upward mobility in individual 
earnings from the bottom quintile in the Scandinavian countries than in the United Kingdom 
and especially the United States, and those of Raum et al. (2007) that the intergenerational 
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transmission of family earnings is also significantly stronger in the UK and even more so the 
USA than in the Scandinavian countries, are suggestive (see also Aaberge et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, recent studies by Esping-Andersen and Wagner (2010) and Whelan, Nolan and 
Maitre (2013) have been able to exploit the availability of harmonised data from a special 
module on intergenerational transmission attached to EU-SILC in 2005. Esping-Andersen 
and Wagner estimate the impact of economic hardship during childhood on both educational 
attainment and adult income (controlling inter alia for lone motherhood and parents’ 
education) in Denmark, Norway, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. They 
conclude that economic hardship in childhood has no direct effects on adult income in any of 
the countries, but does have powerful indirect effects via children’s educational attainment; 
this effect disappears among the youngest cohorts in both Denmark and Norway but not in 
the other countries, leading the authors to conclude that the Scandinavian countries are more 
recently succeeding in minimising the adverse consequences of economic want in childhood. 
This is consistent with Whelan, Nolan and Maitre’s study, which included a broader range of 
EU countries and found that factors such as parental class, parental education, and childhood 
economic circumstances/hardship had less influence on both income poverty and a broader, 
multidimensional measure of vulnerability in social democratic countries than in countries in 
the liberal and southern European welfare regimes.  
Understanding the mechanisms at work is clearly vital in designing strategies aimed at 
reducing the extent to which poverty is handed down from one generation to the next, and 
both causal channels and policy responses have been the subject of substantial bodies of 
literature (for reviews see Esping-Andersen, 2004a, 2004b; D’Addio, 2007; Nolan et al., 
2011). Studies focused on the United States show that the inheritance of poverty is connected 
with substantially less schooling (on average, poor children will have two years less 
schooling than non-poor children), poor health, and crime (Mayer, 1997; Duncan and 
Brooks-Gunn, 1997), and similar if less dramatic effects have been documented for the 
United Kingdom (Gregg et al., 1999) and France (Maurin, 2002; CERC, 2004). Gregg et al.’s 
(1999) study controls for the child’s abilities (via cognitive test scores at age seven), and still 
finds strong poverty effects. US and British studies demonstrate strong negative effects of 
lone motherhood on child outcomes, but also suggest that the main reason has to do with poor 
economic conditions (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; Biblarz and Raftery, 1999, Gregg et 
al., 1999), while selection into lone parenthood may also be a factor (Piketty, 2003). 
Interestingly, Esping-Andersen and Wagner’s (2010) multi-country study found no 
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significant effects of lone motherhood on educational attainment or adult income having 
controlled for mother’s education and childhood financial hardship.  
The impact of genes/nature versus nurture and the interactions between them have 
been the topic of much debate in the broader intergenerational mobility literature, as 
discussed in Jäntti and Jenkins’ chapter. (See also Chapter 18 by Deaton for a detailed 
discussion on health and inequality). From the point of view of transmission of poverty and 
disadvantage, the key thrust of recent findings is that cognitive skills and family finances 
matter, but so do non-cognitive abilities, social skills, cultural resources, motivation and, 
more generally, the familial ‘learning milieu’: cognitive and non-cognitive skills are 
influenced by family endowments that are neither strictly financial or genetic. Heckman and 
Lochner (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2003) have been influential studies, with their 
‘learning-begets-learning’ model stressing the fundamental causal importance of conditions 
in the pre-school years, especially those related to behavioural and cognitive development. 
There is a growing consensus in the literature that conditions when children are under age 6, 
or even 3, are decisive for their cognitive skills, sense of security, and ability and motivation 
to learn (Danziger and Waldfogel, 2000; Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997). Substantial 
differences in children’s cognitive abilities by parents’ socio-economic status emerge at early 
ages and carry through to subsequent achievements in education and earnings (e.g. Cunha 
and Heckman, 2007); poverty in early childhood has strong adverse effects on these later 
outcomes, partly because of parental traits such as poor cognitive and non-cognitive skills 
and the effects of family ‘culture’, in particular in terms of how it influences parenting 
behavior and child stimulation (de Graaf et al., 2000; Esping-Andersen, 2007).  
This has significantly influenced thinking about the role of education in seeking to 
reduce intergenerational transmission of poverty. Mounting evidence suggests that 
differences in the design and financing of education systems per se seem to matter rather less 
than had been thought. There appears to be a broad consensus that early tracking according to 
ability reduces educational mobility across generations (see for example Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2006), with the abolition of early tracking and the introduction of 
comprehensive school systems seen to have boosted educational attainment among the least 
privileged social strata in Sweden, Finland and Norway. Since these are also countries in 
which welfare state redistribution increased substantially over the same period, it is difficult 
to identify how much it was education reform or income equalization that produced higher 
mobility. However, Blanden et al.’s (2005) UK analyses suggest that education reform which 
delayed tracking produced a substantial increase in inter-generational mobility there, 
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primarily to the benefit of children from low income families, which cannot be ascribed to an 
increase in welfare state redistribution since over the period in question income inequality 
actually grew. More broadly, though, it has become increasingly clear that generalised 
policies promoting the attainment of higher levels of education by increasing the proportion 
going on to third level – assigned a central role in strategies aimed at improving equality of 
opportunity in many countries – may not be adequate if the aim is to address the 
disadvantages that children from poorer backgrounds face from the outset.  
This has served to reinforce the emphasis in recent literature arguing for an early 
childhood focus, and that high quality early childhood programmes can significantly improve 
both cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes for disadvantaged children (Currie, 2001; 
Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Karoly et al., 2005; Waldfogel, 2006). Heckman’s work has 
been particularly influential in demonstrating that investing in early childhood is a cost-
effective policy (though the broader implications in terms of later interventions have been 
hotly debated). The core evidence that underpins Heckman’s work comes from early 
intervention programs in the US, but Esping-Andersen (2004) relates the significant decline 
in social inheritance effects for the Nordic countries to the introduction of universal, high-
quality child care. Schutz et al (2005) in their cross-sectional comparison across countries 
report an inverted U-shaped relationship between family background effect and pre-school 
enrolment, which suggests that early education may reduce the extent to which family 
background shapes life-chances. OECD (2009) concludes that good quality care in early 
childhood, pre-school and also school years, are essential tools for promoting 
intergenerational mobility. 
Going beyond education, the extent and nature of the welfare state itself can clearly 
affect the intergenerational transmission of poverty, indeed this is often articulated as a core 
aim in terms of equalizing children’s life chances and avoiding wasted potential. One might 
expect that social policies that reduce child poverty (such as effective income support and 
promoting maternal employment, as discussed earlier - see for example UNICEF, 2007, 
Whiteford and Adema, 2007) would also promote more inter-generational inequality, but 
directly demonstrating that link is less straightforward. Mayer (1997), for example, argued 
that low income in itself is less important than parental characteristics such as low skills, poor 
health, or deviance which affect the likelihood of being poor. In a comparison across US 
states, though, Mayer and Lopoo (2008) find that in high-spending states the difference in 
mobility between advantaged and disadvantaged children is smaller than in low-spending 
ones. It has been calculated that the risk of child poverty falls by a factor of four when 
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mothers are employed (Esping-Andersen, 2009). There is also some evidence that inter-
generational transmission of welfare dependency may be related to programme design, with 
Corak et al.’s (2004) comparison of cash support schemes in the USA and Sweden suggesting 
that passive programmes are more likely to promote the transmission of welfare dependency 
than active ones. More generally, benefit systems that rely heavily on means-testing are more 
likely to create the poverty and unemployment traps that make it more likely that poverty and 
welfare dependency persist into subsequent generations. 
Finally, still focusing on children and the transmission of poverty, an issue that has 
received considerable attention in the research literature is the potential effect of living in a 
“bad” neighbourhood. Some studies suggest that local conditions can help explain the 
intergenerational transmission of income (OECD 2008), though their impact may be 
relatively weak even in the USA. The range of US-focused studies reported in for example 
Brooks-Gunn, Aber and Duncan (1997) suggested that neighbourhood does matter for child 
and youth development, having greatest impact in early childhood and late adolescence and 
less in between, but the size of these effects was usually much smaller than those of family-
level conditions. Solon, Page and Duncan (2000) used the cluster sampling design of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate both sibling and neighbourhood correlations of 
years of schooling, and found sibling correlations of around 0.5, whereas their neighbourhood 
estimates were as low as 0.1. Raaum, Salvanes, and Sorensen (2003) used Norwegian census 
data and concluded likewise that neighbourhood correlations were small compared to sibling 
correlations, both for educational attainment and long-run earnings. This is consistent with 
the findings of US experiments where families living in public housing were assigned 
housing vouchers by lottery encouraging them to move to neighbourhoods with lower 
poverty rates; the results reported in Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) show no significant effects on 
test scores. Looking beyond educational attainment to a broader set of poverty-related 
outcomes, the difficulties in adequately characterising neighbourhoods in terms of all their 
potentially relevant characteristics, and of distinguishing their effects on poverty and related 
outcomes from those of individual/family characteristics – taking into account that there may 
be interactions between them – have also been emphasised in research outside the USA (see 
for example Lupton, 2003).   
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Section 4: The Welfare State, Anti-Poverty Policy and the Economic 
Crisis of the Late 2000s 
4.1 Poverty, Income Inequality and the Economic Crisis 
The economic crisis experienced by the OECD countries since 2007-2008 has been 
the most serious since the Great Depression of the 1930s in terms of its impact on output and 
growth, and is central to the ways in which poverty and anti-poverty policies are now being 
thought about, studied and debated. The crisis has impacted on poverty directly, as we will 
discuss, but also has altered the context in which welfare states are currently operating and 
perspectives on how they are and should be evolving in the medium-term. Here we look first 
at the evidence on the immediate impact of the crisis, and then at the medium-term context 
for anti-poverty policy. 
The immediate impact of the crisis on income inequality and poverty has been the 
subject of a number of national and comparative studies, including Matsaganis and Leventi 
(2013), Callan, Nolan and Walsh (2011), Immervoll, Peichl and Tatsiramos (2011), Figari, 
Salvatore and Sutherland (2011) and Jenkins, Brandolini, Micklewright and Nolan (2013). 
Jenkins et al. adopt a comparative perspective, looking at aggregate indicators across the 
OECD and at six case-study countries in depth. Their central conclusion is that the immediate 
impact of the crisis on income inequality and income poverty in most countries was much 
more modest than the dramatic experience of the Great Depression, although not so different 
from some more recent recessions such as the Nordic crisis of the early 1990s. They stress 
that a striking feature of the crisis from 2007-8 has been the extent to which its 
macroeconomic impact varied across countries: in some there were major declines in 
economic activity and sharply rising unemployment, but in others much more modest 
changes in growth and employment (on which see also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012). The 
peak-to-trough fall in quarterly GDP was substantially larger than the average fall during 
recessions over the previous 50 years almost everywhere, but ranged nonetheless from zero in 
Australia to nearly 13 per cent in Ireland. Another feature highlighted is that GDP declines 
were not fully transmitted into falls in the real disposable income of households, which were 
protected by both automatic stabilisers and additional support of governments through the tax 
and benefit system. The immediate response of employment to the fall in GDP was also 
frequently smaller than in previous recessions, though this was not the case in countries such 
as Ireland, Spain, and the USA where a boom-bust pattern in the housing market played an 
important role in the recession. Large falls in individual employment were also accompanied 
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by significant rises in household worklessness in countries such as Ireland, Spain and the 
USA, but not in some others – notably Denmark and Finland – where the workless household 
rate fell despite relatively large increases in the individual non-employment rate, cushioning 
the impact on poverty. Another feature of the immediate onset of the crisis was the decline in 
income from capital, concentrated among richer households.  
Looking at available poverty indicators up to 2009 compared with pre-crisis, Jenkins 
et al found that relative income poverty rates typically fell in European countries, whereas 
absolute poverty rates (i.e. using ‘anchored’ income thresholds indexed to prices) tended to 
fall slightly in Europe while rising modestly in the USA (as measured with the US official 
poverty line), but in both cases these rates fell for the elderly. The six countries they studied 
in detail – Germany, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the USA – experienced differing 
macroeconomic shocks, with Germany recovering very rapidly, Sweden seeing a large 
decline in GDP but relatively rapid recovery, the USA experiencing marked contraction 
followed by some recovery, Italy and the UK seeing major downturns and Ireland 
experiencing the largest GDP decline among OECD countries. Germany saw little change in 
employment, whereas in Ireland and the USA at the other extreme unemployment rose 
rapidly. The short-run impact on household income inequality and poverty was relatively 
modest. In Germany, the proportion of persons with a household income less than 60 per cent 
of the contemporary median income declined marginally, and the proportion in households 
below such an income threshold held fixed in purchasing power at its 2007 level also fell. 
Chapter 3 shows that median income, inequality and relative poverty all rose slightly in 2010. 
In the UK, the number falling below 60 per cent of median income fell by more than one 
percentage point and a fixed real threshold showed a larger decline in poverty. In Sweden, the 
proportion falling below 60 per cent of median income increased, although when a threshold 
fixed in purchasing power terms is employed the increase was a good deal smaller. In Ireland, 
relative income poverty declined between 2007 and 2009 while the proportion below a fixed 
real income threshold remained stable. In Italy the buffering role of social transfers was 
relatively limited, although the consequent increase in poverty might be considered modest 
given the scale of the initial macroeconomic shock. Finally, in the USA the relative poverty 
rate declined modestly, reflecting a decline in real median income, whereas the official 
poverty rate (calculated using a low-income cut-off held fixed in real terms) increased. In all 
six case study countries, elderly people were relatively well protected, compared with 
children and individuals of working age.  
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The variation in the distributional impact of the crisis to date across countries reflects 
not only differences in the nature of the macroeconomic downturn but also differences in how 
cash transfers and direct taxes cushioned household net incomes from the full effects of what 
was happening to market incomes. To some extent, these are differences in automatic 
stabilisation and so vary with the generosity and comprehensiveness of social safety-nets and 
the structure and levels of direct taxes and social insurance contributions. But policy 
responses and choices as the recession impacted have also been important.  
More recent poverty indicators for European countries produced by Eurostat, up to 
2011, also show that experiences have been quite varied. As shown in Table 5, between 2007 
and 2011 the proportion falling below 60% of median income rose by 1 percentage point or 
more in 8 countries, fell by that amount in 7, and was stable in the rest. The average relative 
income poverty rate across the EU 27 was 16.5% in 2007 and 16.9 in 2011. Income poverty 
rates ‘anchored’ at the 2008 60% of median threshold and then indexed to prices showed a 
good deal more variability over time across EU countries, as Table 6 shows. This rose in 13 
countries, sometimes by a remarkably large amount – by 11 percentage points in Latvia and 
Lithuania and almost 14 percentage points in Iceland; however, it fell in another 10 countries, 
so that the overall average across the EU rose only from 16.4% to 17.5 %. It is interesting to 
compare this with the trend in material deprivation over the same period, as measured by the 
EU’s severe material deprivation indicator: Table 7 shows that this rose between 2008 and 
2011 in 13 countries while falling in 6; the average across the EU rose marginally. Among 
countries particularly hard-hit by the crisis deprivation rose sharply in Ireland, Spain, Greece 
and Italy, as well as Latvia and Lithuania, but fell in Portugal.  
 
4.2 The Crisis and Anti-Poverty Policy in the Medium Term 
The immediate impact of the onset of the crisis from 2007-8 on living standards and 
poverty was cushioned, at least to some extent, by welfare state institutions and in particular 
by social protection and tax systems. The medium-term impact of the crisis on poverty 
depends not only on developments in the macroeconomy and in employment, but also on the 
policies adopted with respect to the welfare state broadly conceived and to transfers most 
particularly, and the effects of the crisis on the public finances are dominant in framing the 
context in which these choices are being made. The need – or perception of such a need - to 
consolidate public finances plays a central role in debates about responding to the crisis, with 
tackling poverty often relegated to a more modest role, and this could lead to changes to 
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welfare state systems and parameters that will take many years to work their way through, 
continuing to impact on poverty long after economic growth has resumed and the recession is 
considered to have ended from a purely macroeconomic perspective. (The fairness of fiscal 
consolidation programmes may itself affect the likelihood of them being successful, as 
analysed by Kaplanoglou, Raponos and Bardakas (2013) for 29 OECD countries over the 
period 1971-2009; their results suggest that programmes improving the targeting of social 
transfers and their effectiveness in poverty alleviation, increasing spending on training and 
active labour market policies, and even reducing value-added taxes on necessities, enhance 
the probability of successful adjustment while promoting social cohesion.)  
The variation across countries in the impact of the economic crisis on poverty reflects 
not only differences in the nature of the macroeconomic downturn but also differences in how 
cash transfers and direct taxes cushioned household net incomes from the full effects of what 
was happening to market incomes. To some extent, these are differences in automatic 
stabilisation and so vary with the generosity and comprehensiveness of social safety-nets and 
the structure and levels of direct taxes and social insurance contributions, as brought out in 
Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl’s (2011, 2012) cross-country comparisons based on simulating tax-
benefit models. However, policy choices as the recession impacted have also been important 
(for more discussion of EU governments’ initial responses, see Marchal, Marx, and Van 
Mechelen 2014). It is also worth emphasising that conventional income-based poverty 
measures may well miss some of the most important effects of ‘austerity’, since ‘non-cash’ 
income from government services and the impact of increases in indirect taxation are not 
captured.  
In such a context, the pressure to increase the targeting of cash transfers is likely to 
intensify, although that can run the risk of worsening poverty and unemployment ‘traps’ and 
undermining the bases for social solidarity and political support for relatively generous 
provision. The notion of ‘social investment’ has come to play a major part in debates about 
the role of social spending and the future of welfare states in the rich countries, particularly in 
Europe where the language of social investment has become embedded in European Union 
discourse since the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000. A number of important recent 
contributions have highlighted its potential as a new perspective on or paradigm for social 
policy in the context of the economic crisis and to the demand of the knowledge-based 
economy more broadly, as an alternative to neoliberal responses focusing on retrenchment in 
social spending, and as a key ingredient in responding to the macroeconomic/Euro crisis (see 
for example the contributions to Morel, Palier and Palme, 2011, Vandenbroucke, Hemerijck 
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and Palier, 2011, and Hemerijck and Vandenbroucke, 2012) Others have sought to assess the 
extent to which recent directions in social policies and spending patterns could be 
characterised as moving towards a social investment strategy, and whether disappointing 
outcomes in terms of poverty can be seen as a failure of such a strategy (Cantillon, 2011; 
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011; Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 2012). The EU is 
paying serious attention to this debate, as evidenced by the establishment by DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of an expert group on Social Investment 
for Growth and Cohesion in autumn 2012 as input to a major initiative envisaged in the area 
of social policies.  
‘Social investment’ may be viewed in a number of distinct ways, as Nolan (2013) 
discusses: as a paradigm and strategy for social policies and spending, as a conceptual base 
and analytical framework, and/or as a platform for political engagement in both a narrow and 
broad sense. Whether social investment can credibly be presented as the paradigm most likely 
to underpin economic growth or employment is open to debate and merits further research, 
even if – as Nolan (2013) argues – the distinction between social ‘investment’ and other 
social spending is not particularly robust, conceptually and empirically. Highlighting that 
distinction may not in any case be the most useful and productive way to frame the debate 
about the future of social spending, where concentration on a narrow economic argument 
runs the risk of obscuring normative choices and the broader case for social spending.  
Finally, it is important to note that an economic crisis of the depth and nature of the 
one which began in 2007-8 may also have major implications for intergenerational equity, 
especially if it continues to be the case that the elderly are relatively well-cushioned from its 
effects compared to younger people; sustained high unemployment in particular may well 
result in long-term ‘scarring’ of those affected, with the risk that their disadvantage is 
transmitted to the next generation.  
Section 5: Future Research Directions 
We conclude with a brief discussion of priorities for research on poverty and anti-
poverty policy. The key challenges lie in deepening understanding of the processes at work in 
creating and perpetuating poverty at individual, household, national and cross-national level. 
While much has been learned about the characteristics associated with poverty in different 
countries, the fact that this differs so widely across countries provides a window into the 
nature of the underlying processes that has not been fully exploited. In the same vein, 
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studying the factors associated with change over time in a specific country is valuable but 
putting these changes in a comparative perspective adds another dimension. So a panel of 
countries approach has increasing potential as the statistical underpinning in terms of 
comparable data continues to be built. This can be complemented by continued development 
of the potential to carry out micro-simulation analysis in a comparative perspective; the 
challenge of incorporating behavioural responses into such analysis remains substantial 
(Immervoll et al., 2007). Exploiting the potential of panel data will continue to be a priority, 
for example to reliably distinguish those genuinely and persistently on low income, and 
understanding the barriers to income smoothing facing those on low income more transiently. 
Increasing recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and social exclusion points 
to the need to deepen understanding of the linkages between different forms of deprivation 
and exclusion, moving beyond descriptive analysis of the extent to which they go together to 
study the processes that underpin the underlying relationships between them – where once 
again a comparative perspective is invaluable – while also addressing the difficult conceptual 
issues involved. 
There also remains a substantial research agenda in the field of anti-poverty policy. 
Not many countries have made very substantial progress in reducing relative poverty as 
conventionally measured in recent years, though material deprivation and absolute poverty 
have generally declined up to the crisis from 2008. While some progress has been made in 
understanding the factors at work, many of the deeper causal questions remain largely 
unsettled. Changes in the distribution of income from the market may have made reducing 
relative poverty more difficult, and the redistributive impact of tax and benefit systems may 
have declined, and each needs to be much better understood. A key question is whether the 
apparent failure of many governments to maintain or to improve the anti-poverty impact of 
their tax and benefit systems is a consequence of lack of effective political will (voter 
preferences) or reflects instead (or as well) systemic limits and/or external constraints. 
Important items on the policy research agenda include: 
• Can more be done with less? There is a continuing controversy over targeting and 
cost-effectiveness of public social expenditure. With ageing populations and rising 
needs due to socio-demographic and economic trends, this question is bound to 
remain at the forefront of the research agenda. 
• Why are anti-poverty provisions in many countries so manifestly inadequate? Are 
there systemic limits to incrementalism in redistributive policy? That is to say: are 
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there really limits to what improvement can be achieved by strengthening the existing 
main pillars of redistribution: wage and broader market force regulation, social 
insurance, social assistance and taxes? What promise do new redistributive 
mechanisms and programs offer? Negative income taxes and associated systems are 
seen as the way forward by some but short-term issues such as take-up and longer-
term effects on wages and human capital formation, earnings mobility etc. are not 
well-understood. 
• What is the optimal balance between direct redistribution and ‘social investment’, i.e. 
expenditures that seek to generate lasting effects through improvements in skills and 
capabilities? To what extent can social investment act as a substitute for direct 
‘compensatory’ redistribution, or is there complementarity? If so, what is the optimal 
balance? 
• Making cash benefits and services conditional on certain behavioural requirements 
and conditions is a policy strategy that is gaining increased attention, part of a broader 
current towards more micro-intervention in social policy, informed by social 
experiments. Is such a shift from the macro to the micro-level really the way forward, 
and what, if any, are the limits there? 
Finally, we should note that while this survey has focused on the ‘rich world’ (as it is 
conventionally understood), some of the most innovative anti-poverty policy is being 
conceived, implemented and analysed outside of that area, with a number of South American 
and Asian countries standing out in this respect. An important task for future research is to 
integrate these rich but largely parallel streams of poverty research. 
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Figure 1. Gini Coefficient for Disposable Income and Relative Income Poverty (60% median), 2009, 
OECD  
 
Source: OECD income distribution database. 
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Figure 2. Cash public social expenditure and income inequality on working age in OECD countries, 
2009 
 
Note: Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable household income among the population aged 18-65. 
Source: OECD Divided We Stand (gini); OECD SOCX (social expenditure)  
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Figure 3. Concentration index (ranking by gross income) and redistributive impact, mid 2000s.  
 
Note: 1) for Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia and Spain calculations are based on 
disposable incomes instead of gross incomes due to data availability. 2) The countries included in 
Korpi and Palme (1998) are in bold. 
Source: Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist (2013) on the basis of the Luxembourg Income Study 
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Figure 4. The level of the social safety net in the EU and three US States, 2012 
 
Note: In some countries, such as the US, Italy and Bulgaria, time limits apply, either formal or 
discretionary. In order to avoid additional assumptions, the levels displayed do not take these time 
limits into account. 
Source: Source: CSB-MIPI (Van Mechelen, et al., 2011), (Eurostat, 2011; U.S. Bureau of the Census 
and Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2011) 
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Figure 5. Gross minimum wages and net incomes at minimum wage as a percentage of the relative 
poverty threshold, 2012, selected EU Member States plus United States (New Jersey) 
 
Source: CSB-MIPI (Van Mechelen, et al., 2011), (Eurostat, 2011; U.S. Bureau of the Census and 
Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2011) 
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Figure 6. Taxonomy of different types of retirement-income provision 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2011b) 
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Figure 7. Net pension replacement rates by pension schemes in OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD (2011b). Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure 8. Risk of relative poverty by age of individuals in OECD-7 countries (Poverty rate of the 
entire population in each year = 100) 
 
Note: Relative poverty risk is the age-specific poverty rate divided by the poverty rate for the entire 
population times 100. The poverty threshold is set at 50% of median income of the entire population. 
OECD-7 is the average for Canada, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Source: OECD (2008).  
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Table 1. Income Poverty Rates in OECD Countries, Mid-2000s 
 Country  % below 50% of median income  % below 60% of median income 
Australia (2003) 12.3 20.4 
Austria (2004) 7.1 13.4 
Belgium (2000) 8.1 16.1 
Canada (2007) 11.9 18.7 
Czech Rep (2004) 5.8 11.4 
Denmark (2004) 5.6 13.2 
Estonia (2004) 12.8 20.4 
Finland (2004) 6.6 13.7 
France (2005) 8.5 14.9 
Germany (2007) 8.4 14.6 
Greece (2004) 11.9 19.6 
Hungary (2005) 7.4 12.5 
Ireland (2004) 13.2 22.0 
Italy (2008) 11.9 19.7 
Luxembourg (2004) 8.9 13.8 
Mexico (2004) 18.3 25.5 
Netherlands (2004) 6.3 11.8 
Norway (2004) 7.1 12.8 
Poland (2004) 10.7 17.2 
Slovenia (2004) 7.1 11.7 
Spain (2007) 13.7 20.3 
Sweden (2005) 5.6 12.0 
Switzerland (2004) 8.0 14.8 
UK (2004) 11.2 19.0 
USA (2007) 17.7 24.4 
Source: LIS, downloaded  
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Table 2. Income Poverty Rates for Children and Elderly in OECD Countries, Mid-2000s 
Country % of below 50% of median income 
 Children Elderly (65+) All 
Australia (2003) 14.0 22.3 12.3 
Austria (2004) 6.8 9.4 7.1 
Belgium (2000) 7.2 15.4 8.1 
Canada (2007) 15.0 8.3 11.9 
Czech Rep (2004) 10.2 2.1 5.8 
Denmark (2004) 3.9 8.5 5.6 
Estonia (2004) 15.4 13.5 12.8 
Finland (2004) 4.1 10.3 6.6 
France (2005) 10.2 7.4 8.5 
Germany (2007) 9.3 9.0 8.4 
Greece (2004) 12.4 18.8 11.9 
Hungary (2005) 9.9 4.0 7.4 
Ireland (2004) 15.9 23.8 13.2 
Italy (2008) 17.1 11.0 11.9 
Luxembourg (2004) 13.5 4.7 8.9 
Mexico (2004) 22.2 27.1 18.3 
Netherlands (2004) 9.2 2.4 6.3 
Norway (2004) 5.3 8.5 7.1 
Poland (2004) 15.6 3.5 10.7 
Slovenia (2004) 5.5 16.4 7.1 
Spain (2007) 17.3 20.7 13.7 
Sweden (2005) 4.7 6.6 5.6 
Switzerland (2004) 9.3 15.1 8.0 
UK (2004) 13.0 16.3 11.2 
USA (2004) 22.0 24.2 17.7 
Source: LIS downloaded 
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Table 3: Income Poverty Rates Pre- and Post-Transfers in EU Countries, 2007 
Country Pre-transfer 
poverty 
Post-transfer 
poverty 
Reduction in poverty 
 % % % point % 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czech Rep 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Hungary 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
 
27.5 
25.5 
20.1 
27.1 
24.8 
25.2 
33.1 
23.7 
23.9 
26.4 
24.1 
21.0 
27.2 
25.5 
23.4 
29.3 
21.2 
20.6 
24.7 
26.5 
24.2 
30.9 
23.1 
18.2 
28.9 
27.5 
29.7 
15.2 
22.0 
9.6 
11.7 
15.2 
19.4 
17.2 
20.3 
19.7 
13.1 
19.8 
15.5 
21.2 
19.1 
13.5 
12.3 
14.8 
10.2 
12.0 
17.3 
18.1 
24.8 
11.5 
10.6 
13.0 
10.5 
18.6 
12.3 
3.5 
10.5 
15.4 
9.6 
5.8 
15.9 
3.4 
4.2 
13.3 
4.3 
5.5 
6.0 
6.4 
9.9 
17.0 
6.4 
10.4 
12.7 
9.2 
6.1 
6.1 
11.6 
7.6 
15.9 
17.0 
11.1 
44.7 
13.7 
52.2 
56.8 
38.7 
23.0 
48.0 
14.3 
17.6 
50.4 
17.8 
26.2 
22.1 
25.1 
42.3 
58.0 
30.2 
50.5 
51.4 
34.7 
25.2 
19.7 
50.2 
41.8 
55.0 
61.8 
37.4 
Eurostat downloaded. 
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Table 4. Social Expenditure Distinguishing Cash and Non-Cash Benefits as Percentage of 
GDP in OECD Countries, Mid-2000s 
Country Cash transfers 
% of GDP 
Non-cash social benefits 
% of GDP 
Australia 8.1 6.7 
Austria 18.4 8.2 
Belgium 16.2 9.1 
Canada 8.8 9.4 
Czech Republic 11.4 7.8 
Denmark 13.8 11.8 
Finland 15.3 9.9 
France 17.5 10.8 
Germany 15.9 9.9 
Greece 13.4 7.1 
Hungary 13.8 8.7 
Ireland 8.4 7.7 
Italy 16.7 7.7 
Japan 10.2 8.1 
Luxembourg 13.9 8.8 
Netherlands  11.1 8.5 
New Zealand 9.7 8.4 
Norway 10.9 10.1 
Poland 15.7 4.9 
Slovak Republic 10.2 6.1 
Spain 13.1 7.4 
Sweden 14.5 13.6 
Switzerland 11.8 7.8 
UK 10.3 10.5 
USA 8.0 7.0 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database 
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Table 5. Relative Income Poverty Rates (60% of Median Threshold), European Union Countries 
2007-2011 
 Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
  % % % % % 
Belgium 15.2 14.7 14.6 14.6 15.3 
Bulgaria 22.0 21.4 21.8 20.7 22.3 
Czech Republic 9.6 9.0 8.6 9.0 9.8 
Denmark 11.7 11.8 13.1 13.3 13.0 
Germany  15.2 15.2 15.5 15.6 15.8 
Estonia 19.4 19.5 19.7 15.8 17.5 
Ireland 17.2 15.5 15.0 16.1 : 
Greece 20.3 20.1 19.7 20.1 21.4 
Spain 19.7 19.6 19.5 20.7 21.8 
France 13.1 12.7 12.9 13.3 14.0 
Italy 19.8 18.7 18.4 18.2 19.6 
Cyprus 15.5 15.9 15.8 15.1 14.5 
Latvia 21.2 25.6 25.7 21.3 19.1 
Lithuania 19.1 20.0 20.6 20.2 20.0 
Luxembourg 13.5 13.4 14.9 14.5 13.6 
Hungary 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.3 13.8 
Malta 14.8 15.0 15.3 15.0 15.4 
Netherlands 10.2 10.5 11.1 10.3 11.0 
Austria 12.0 12.4 12.0 12.1 12.6 
Poland 17.3 16.9 17.1 17.6 17.7 
Portugal 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.9 18.0 
Romania 24.8 23.4 22.4 21.1 22.2 
Slovenia 11.5 12.3 11.3 12.7 13.6 
Slovakia 10.6 10.9 11.0 12.0 13.0 
Finland 13.0 13.6 13.8 13.1 13.7 
Sweden 10.5 12.2 13.3 12.9 14.0 
United Kingdom 18.6 18.7 17.3 17.1 16.2 
Iceland 10.1 10.1 10.2 9.8 9.2 
Norway 11.9 11.4 11.7 11.2 10.5 
Switzerland : 16.2 15.1 15.0 15.0 
Croatia 18 17.3 17.9 20.5 21.1 
European Union (27 countries) 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.4 16.9 
Note: The household income statistics in Eurostat are mainly produced with EU-SILC data, which 
reference period is a fixed 12-month period (such as the previous calendar or tax year) for all 
countries except UK for which the income reference period is the current year and IE for which the 
survey is continuous and income is collected for the last twelve months.  
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 20 March 2013) 
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Table 6. ‘Anchored’ Income Poverty Rates (60% of Median Threshold in 2008, Indexed to Consumer 
Prices Subsequently), European Union Countries 2008-2011 
 Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 
  % % % % 
Belgium 14.7 13.1 13.0 13.5 
Bulgaria 21.4 16.1 14.8 17.8 
Czech Republic 9.0 8.1 7.8 8.6 
Denmark 11.8 13.1 12.6 12.2 
Germany  15.2 16.0 15.8 15.9 
Estonia 19.5 18.9 19.7 23.9 
Ireland 15.5 15.4 22.8 : 
Greece 20.1 18.9 18.0 24.9 
Spain 19.6 20.2 22.3 25.7 
France 12.7 12.7 12.3 13.9 
Italy 18.7 19.9 19.3 21.4 
Cyprus 15.9 16.3 16.2 14.4 
Latvia 25.6 26.0 33.0 36.2 
Lithuania 20.0 18.6 28.4 30.8 
Luxembourg 13.4 15.5 14.4 14.6 
Hungary 12.4 11.8 13.7 14.7 
Malta 15.0 14.3 16.5 15.9 
Netherlands 10.5 10.6 10.0 11.0 
Austria 12.4 11.4 11.0 10.5 
Poland 16.9 13.7 13.0 11.9 
Portugal 18.5 18.1 16.1 17.9 
Romania 23.4 18.2 16.2 17.9 
Slovenia 12.3 10.2 12.1 13.0 
Slovakia 10.9 7.8 7.3 7.0 
Finland 13.6 13.0 12.0 12.3 
Sweden 12.2 11.7 11.2 11.6 
United Kingdom 18.7 20.4 21.4 21.8 
Iceland 10.1 9.8 16.7 23.7 
Norway 11.4 10.2 9.6 8.9 
Switzerland 16.2 13.8 13.8 13.1 
European Union (27 countries) 16.4 16.3 16.4 17.5 
Note: The household income statistics in Eurostat are mainly produced with EU-SILC data, which 
reference period is a fixed 12-month period (such as the previous calendar or tax year) for all 
countries except UK for which the income reference period is the current year and IE for which the 
survey is continuous and income is collected for the last twelve months.  
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 20 March 2013) 
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Table 7: Severe Material Deprivation Rate, European Union Countries 2008-2011 
 Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 % % % % % 
Belgium 5.7 5.6 5.2 5.9 5.7 
Bulgaria 57.6 41.2 41.9 45.7 43.6 
Czech Republic 7.4 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 
Denmark 3.3 2.0 2.3 2.7 2.6 
Germany  4.8 5.5 5.4 4.5 5.3 
Estonia 5.6 4.9 6.2 9.0 8.7 
Ireland 4.5 5.5 6.1 7.5 : 
Greece 11.5 11.2 11.0 11.6 15.2 
Spain 3.0 2.5 3.5 4.0 3.9 
France 4.7 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.2 
Italy 6.8 7.5 7.0 6.9 11.2 
Cyprus 13.3 9.1 9.5 10.1 10.8 
Latvia 24.9 19.0 21.9 27.4 31.4 
Lithuania 16.6 12.3 15.1 19.5 18.5 
Luxembourg 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.5 1.2 
Hungary 19.9 17.9 20.3 21.6 23.1 
Malta 4.2 4.0 4.7 5.7 6.3 
Netherlands 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.2 2.5 
Austria 3.3 6.4 4.8 4.3 3.9 
Poland 22.3 17.7 15.0 14.2 13.0 
Portugal 9.6 9.7 9.1 9.0 8.3 
Romania 36.5 32.9 32.2 31.0 29.4 
Slovenia 5.1 6.7 6.1 5.9 6.1 
Slovakia 13.7 11.8 11.1 11.4 10.6 
Finland 3.6 3.5 2.8 2.8 3.2 
Sweden 2.2 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.2 
United Kingdom 4.2 4.5 3.3 4.8 5.1 
Iceland 2.1 0.8 0.8 1.8 2.1 
Norway 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.3 
Switzerland : 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.0 
Croatia : : : 14.5 14.8 
European Union (27 countries) 9.1 8.4 8.1 8.3 8.8 
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 20 March 2013) 
 
